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THE EVOLVING FORUM SHOPPING SYSTEM
Christopher A. Whytock†

This Article uses empirical analysis to provide a new understanding of
transnational litigation in U.S. courts. According to conventional wisdom,
the United States has a forum shopping system with two features that encourage plaintiffs to file claims in U.S. courts, even when those claims involve foreign parties or foreign activity: a permissive approach to personal
jurisdiction, giving plaintiffs broad court access, and a strong tendency of
U.S. judges to apply plaintiff-favoring domestic law. This forum shopping
system purportedly contributes to a rising tide of transnational litigation in
the United States. Scholars and interest groups have therefore proposed new
anti–forum shopping measures aimed at curtailing transnational litigation
in U.S. courts.
This Article shows that the forum shopping system has evolved and that
it no longer encourages plaintiffs to pursue transnational claims in U.S.
courts to the extent it supposedly once did. It also presents empirical evidence
that transnational litigation in the United States may have actually decreased, not increased, over the last two decades. The analysis suggests that
new anti–forum shopping measures may not be as urgent or necessary as
their advocates claim. If adopted, such measures could unduly limit access
to justice for both American and foreign citizens who, in our era of globalization, are increasingly affected by transnational activity.
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1
See, e.g., WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN
AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991); see also Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of
Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious
and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 5–10 (1983) (surveying the history of the litigation
explosion claim).
2
See generally WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS,
MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS 74 (2004) (reviewing scholarly research and concluding
that it has “significantly qualified if not refuted claims about mushrooming litigation . . . and [has] provided a far more reasonable portrait of our civil legal system and its
workings”); Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 5–10
(1986) (using litigation-rate data to challenge the litigation explosion claim).
3
Michael J. Saks, If There Be a Crisis, How Shall We Know It?, 46 MD. L. REV. 63, 63
(1986).
4
See, e.g., Spencer Weber Waller, A Unified Theory of Transnational Procedure, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 101, 102 (1993) (noting “explosive growth of transnational litigation” in
U.S. courts); see also infra Part II.B (documenting this belief).
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The claim that the United States is experiencing a litigation explosion has long been a fixture of American discourse.1 Using careful
empirical analysis, legal scholars and social scientists have challenged
this claim and provided a more realistic picture of the American legal
system.2 As one scholar puts it, the litigation explosion is “more rhetorical than real.”3
In our era of globalization, however, this claim has taken on a
new twist. It is now widely believed that the United States is experiencing an explosion of transnational litigation—litigation involving foreign parties or foreign activity.4 Far from being merely rhetorical, a
highly plausible logic supports this belief: Globalization entails increasingly frequent interactions between U.S. and foreign citizens,
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5
See ANDREW S. BELL, FORUM SHOPPING AND VENUE IN TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 335
(2003) (“[T]he . . . emergence of a global economy[ is] a factor which has been apt to
generate an increased number of disputes with a transnational dimension . . . .”).
6
See Russell J. Weintraub, Introduction to Symposium on International Forum Shopping, 37
TEX. INT’L L.J. 463, 463–64 (2002) (describing proplaintiff features of the U.S. legal
system).
7
See infra Part II.A (documenting and explaining this understanding).
8
As used in this Article, U.S. law refers to either U.S. state law or U.S. federal law.
9
Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO. L.J. 53, 68 (1991).
10
See, e.g., INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, GLOBAL FORUM SHOPPING FACT SHEET (2008),
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/images/stories/documents/pdf/GlobalForumShoppingFactSheet.pdf (advocating reforms to reduce global forum shopping into U.S.
courts); Alan O. Sykes, Transnational Forum Shopping as a Trade and Investment Issue, 37 J.
LEGAL STUD. 339, 368–74 (2008) (proposing doctrinal changes to reduce forum shopping); see also infra Conclusion (discussing proposed anti–forum shopping measures).
11
See generally Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional
Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081 (2010) (discussing these costs); infra Conclusion (same).
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thus leading to more transnational disputes.5 The United States has
substantive and procedural laws that are more advantageous to plaintiffs than the laws of other countries.6 And, according to the conventional understanding, two features of the U.S. legal system encourage
plaintiffs to bring transnational disputes to the United States by promising access to these advantages.7 First, the United States employs a
permissive approach to personal jurisdiction, giving plaintiffs—both
domestic and foreign—broad access to U.S. courts. Second, U.S.
judges have a strong tendency to apply the U.S. substantive law that
plaintiffs often prefer, even in lawsuits arising out of events occurring
in foreign countries.8 Together, these features constitute what Louise
Weinberg has aptly called a “forum shopping system.”9
Unlike the standard version of the litigation explosion claim, this
more recent transnational variant has so far escaped empirical scrutiny, perhaps precisely because of its plausibility. Yet such scrutiny is
sorely needed. Based on legitimate concerns about the potentially adverse economic and political consequences of excessive transnational
forum shopping, scholars and interest groups are calling for legal reforms aimed at reducing the flow of transnational litigation into U.S.
courts.10 But these reforms could themselves entail significant costs,
such as reduced access to justice, negative repercussions for foreign
relations, and underregulation of transnational activity.11 The risk is
that exaggerated perceptions of transnational litigation in the United
States could result in exaggerated policy responses that carry their
own adverse consequences.
This Article uses empirical analysis to provide a new, more up-todate understanding of the American forum shopping system and its
impact on transnational litigation in U.S. courts. Specifically, it argues
that the forum shopping system has evolved and no longer encourages plaintiffs to file transnational suits in U.S. courts to the extent it
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12
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (2006) (providing for alienage jurisdiction in controversies between “citizens of a [U.S.] State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state”).
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supposedly once did. Moreover, this Article presents evidence suggesting that there actually has been less—not more—transnational forum shopping into U.S. courts over the last two decades. Thus, new
anti–forum shopping measures may not be as appropriate or urgent
as advocates of these measures suggest, particularly in light of the potential costs of such measures.
This Article proceeds in four main parts. Part I outlines the theoretical foundations for understanding forum shopping behavior and
forum shopping systems. Drawing on strategic choice theory, it argues that, other things being equal, the greater plaintiffs’ expectations
of favorable court access and choice-of-law decisions in a particular
legal system, the more likely they are to file transnational suits in that
system’s courts, thus increasing levels of transnational litigation in
those courts. Generalizing from Weinberg’s concept, Part I defines a
forum shopping system as the features of a legal system that influence
forum shopping behavior by shaping these expectations.
Part II explains the conventional understanding of the American
forum shopping system and its effects on transnational litigation in
U.S. courts. The system’s permissive approach to personal jurisdiction
raises expectations of favorable court access decisions, and its prodomestic-law bias creates high expectations of favorable choice-of-law
decisions. The system is therefore said to encourage plaintiffs to forum shop into the United States, thus contributing to a transnational
litigation explosion.
Part III empirically evaluates the conventional understanding and
finds that it is no longer accurate. First, in the current American forum shopping system, U.S. judges aggressively use the doctrine of forum non conveniens to dismiss transnational suits, thereby offsetting
the effects of permissive personal jurisdiction, and they no longer exhibit pro-domestic-law bias. Second, at least one major form of transnational litigation in the United States has become less, not more,
frequent over the last two decades: alienage litigation—litigation over
which U.S. federal courts have jurisdiction because the dispute is between a U.S. citizen and a foreign citizen.12 This finding cuts against
the claim that transnational litigation in U.S. courts is increasing.
As Part III argues, the forum non conveniens doctrine plays a
central role in the current forum shopping system. However, we know
very little about how judges actually make forum non conveniens decisions. Part IV addresses this gap in our understanding of the American forum shopping system by presenting a systematic empirical
analysis of forum non conveniens decision making. The results sug-
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gest that judges’ forum non conveniens decisions do a better job distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate forum shopping,
are more predictable, and are less influenced by caseload and ideology than the doctrine’s critics indicate. However, the results also reveal evidence of significant discrimination against foreign plaintiffs, at
least in decisions by judges nominated by Republican presidents. This
finding may raise questions about the United States’ compliance with
equal-access provisions in bilateral friendship, commerce, and navigation treaties.
The Article concludes by drawing out the broader implications of
its analysis for legal scholarship and for proposed new anti–forum
shopping measures.

A THEORY

OF

I
FORUM SHOPPING

Forum shopping is a plaintiff’s decision to file a lawsuit in one
court rather than another potentially available court.13 Domestic forum shopping occurs when a plaintiff chooses between two or more
courts within a single country’s legal system, whereas transnational forum shopping occurs when the choice is between the courts of two or
more countries’ legal systems.14 Some commentators use the term forum shopping to refer to lawsuits filed by foreign plaintiffs in U.S.
courts.15 However, a U.S. plaintiff’s decision to file a transnational
suit in a U.S. court is also forum shopping insofar as the decision represents a choice between that court and an available court in another
country.16
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13
See Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV.
553, 554 (1989) (“[F]orum shopping connotes the exercise of the plaintiff’s option to
bring a lawsuit in one of several different courts.”). The term forum shopping is sometimes
used pejoratively. See Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1683–89
(1990) (discussing, but challenging, reasons for this negative view). However, it is important not to embed the definition of forum shopping with assumptions about whether it is
an appropriate behavior. To do so would conflate two distinct modes of analysis: (1) descriptive analysis of forum shopping and its consequences, and (2) normative analysis of
forum shopping. Because sound normative analysis of forum shopping depends on accurate evidence regarding actual forum shopping behavior and its consequences, these two
modes of analysis should be kept distinct.
14
See Sykes, supra note 10, at 339; cf. Juenger, supra note 13, at 560 (distinguishing
domestic and international forum shopping).
15
See, e.g., Global Forum Shopping, INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, http://www.institutefor
legalreform.com/component/ilr_issues/29/item/GFS.html?expand=1 (last visited Nov. 9,
2010) (“Global forum shopping is a disturbing new trend in which foreign plaintiffs take
advantage of the unusually expansive features of the American judicial system to file lawsuits in U.S. courts.”).
16
See Daniel J. Dorward, The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine and the Judicial Protection
of Multinational Corporations from Forum Shopping Plaintiffs, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 141,
165 (1998) (noting that “a domestic plaintiff injured abroad is as likely to forum shop in
the United States as is a foreign plaintiff”); Linda J. Silberman, Developments in Jurisdiction
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Forum shopping depends on two conditions: First, as the foregoing definition implies, more than one court must be potentially available for resolving the plaintiff’s claim.17 Second, the potentially
available legal systems must be heterogeneous.18 If all legal systems
were the same, plaintiffs would have little reason to prefer one court
instead of another.19 In contrast, the heterogeneity of legal systems
means that a plaintiff may be more likely to win (and likely to recover
more) in some legal systems than others, thus creating an incentive to
forum shop.20
In transnational disputes, these two conditions are frequently satisfied. By definition, transnational disputes have connections to more
than one country.21 These connections may be territorial when the
activity or its effects touch the territory of more than one country; or
they may be based on legal relationships between a country and the
actors engaged in or affected by that activity, such as citizenship.22
Because of these multicountry connections, there will often be a potentially available court in more than one country.23 And because the
world’s legal systems are not uniform, transnational disputes will also
generally satisfy the heterogeneity condition.24
By comparing potentially available courts, a plaintiff can determine the court in which she prefers to pursue her claim. From a simple rational choice perspective, she will choose the court in which the

C M
Y K

R

R
R

03/02/2011 13:01:08

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1596280

R

29417_crn_96-3 Sheet No. 29 Side B

and Forum Non Conveniens in International Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and a Proposal for a
Uniform Standard, 28 TEX. INT’L L.J. 501, 502 (1993) (“Courts in the United States attract
plaintiffs, both foreign and resident, because they offer procedural advantages beyond
those of foreign forums . . . .”).
17
Andrew Bell refers to this condition as “concurrent jurisdiction.” See BELL, supra
note 5, at 5 (“The existence of concurrent jurisdiction is the sine qua non for [forum
shopping].”).
18
See id. at 25 (“The raison d’être for forum shopping lies in lack of uniformity
throughout the world’s legal systems . . . .”).
19
Even if legal systems were formally homogeneous, nonlegal differences could motivate forum shopping. See ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ADJUDICATORY AUTHORITY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE
DOCTRINE, POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF COMMON- AND CIVIL-LAW SYSTEMS 194 (2003) (“A
party will, other things being equal, prefer to litigate in a forum that is, geographically
speaking, readily accessible, impartial (or even inclined to favour him), and whose administration of justice is within his cultural and legal tradition.”).
20
See BELL, supra note 5 (“[T]he venue in which a transnational dispute is to be resolved may be of vital importance for the ultimate outcome of the dispute. This will especially be so the greater the differences, whether in matters of procedure, substantive
principles of law, or conflict of law rules, between potentially available forums.”).
21
See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1329 (11th ed. 2004) (defining
“transnational”); Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance, 84 TUL. L.
REV. 67, 71 n.11 (2009) (same).
22
See Whytock, supra note 21.
23
See BELL, supra note 5, at 5 (noting that in transnational litigation, “there will invariably be a number of potential forums whose jurisdictional rules would, prima facie at least,
permit the dispute to be entertained”).
24
See id. at 15 (noting “lack of uniformity . . . in states’ internal laws”).
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expected value of her claim (less the costs of litigation) is the highest
based on the substantive and procedural rules of that court’s legal
system.25 For example, commentators generally believe that “compared with foreign courts, United States forums offer a plaintiff both
lower costs and higher recovery.”26
But forum shopping is not simply a matter of analyzing substantive and procedural law to estimate the comparative expected values
of claims. It also depends on plaintiffs’ expectations about two types
of court decisions: court access decisions and choice-of-law decisions.
In a court access decision, a court determines whether it will allow a
plaintiff’s claim to proceed in that court. For example, court access
decisions in the United States include subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and forum non conveniens decisions. If a court
grants a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter or personal jurisdiction or based on the forum non conveniens doctrine, the plaintiff’s
claim cannot proceed in that court.27 A plaintiff is unlikely to incur
the costs of filing a lawsuit in a particular court unless she believes that
there is some chance of a favorable court access decision.28 Stated
more generally, other things being equal, the higher a plaintiff’s expectation that a particular court will make a favorable court access
decision, the more likely she is to file a lawsuit in that court.29
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25
This perspective is based on the standard rational-choice model of the decision to
sue, according to which a plaintiff will only file a claim if the expected value of the claim
(the probability that the plaintiff will win, p, times the amount of recovery if it wins, w, less
the costs of suit, c) is greater than zero. The so-called “filing condition” is thus
(p*w) – c > 0. ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
33–34 (2003). Extending this basic model to transnational forum shopping, a rational
plaintiff will file her claim in the legal system that maximizes (p*w) – c. See Debra Lyn
Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 383 (2006) (“The law regularly provides more
than one authorized, legitimate forum in which a litigant’s claims may be heard. To shop
among those legitimate choices for the forum that offers the potential for the most
favorable outcome is the only rational decision under rational choice theory and game
theory because forum shopping maximizes the client’s expected payoff.”); Nita Ghei &
Francesco Parisi, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Forum Shopping: Conflicts Law as Spontaneous Order, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1367, 1372 (2004) (“[P]laintiffs will generally seek to file
claims in jurisdictions where the expected net gain is the largest.”).
26
Russell J. Weintraub, International Litigation and Forum Non Conveniens, 29 TEX. INT’L
L.J. 321, 323 (1994).
27
See generally Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access
Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 786–94 (1985) (arguing that these different types of courtaccess decisions are largely redundant).
28
In terms of the rational-choice model, other things being equal, the lower the expectation of a favorable court-access decision, the lower the value of p; and the lower the
value of p, the less likely the filing condition will be satisfied in a particular legal system and
the less likely that (p*w) – c will be maximized in that system.
29
Cf. Michael E. Solimine, The Quiet Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 73 TUL. L. REV.
1, 12 (1998) (“Rational litigants will take into account the prevailing (and shifting) biases
of personal jurisdiction in deciding whether to bring a case at all, and in what forum, and
whether (and how far) to litigate the personal jurisdiction defense, once suit is brought.”).
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In a choice-of-law decision, a court decides whether to apply its
own legal system’s substantive law or a foreign system’s substantive
law.30 Like court access decisions, choice-of-law decisions can have important implications for forum shopping, particularly transnational forum shopping.31 For example, even if a plaintiff files a transnational
suit in a U.S. court because she prefers U.S. substantive law, and even
if the court makes a favorable court access decision, the plaintiff will
not obtain the sought-after benefits of U.S. substantive law unless the
court also decides to apply U.S. law rather than the substantive law of
another country that also has connections to the dispute. In this
sense, choice-of-law decisions can be understood as “law access” decisions. Insofar as a plaintiff’s preference for a court in a particular
legal system stems from a preference for that system’s substantive law,
then, other things being equal, the higher the plaintiff’s expectation
that the court will apply its own domestic law, the higher the likelihood that the plaintiff will select that court.32
In these ways, forum shopping is strategic behavior—that is, behavior by one actor that depends not only on that actor’s preferences
but also on her expectations about the behavior of other actors.33 Forum shopping behavior is based not only on a plaintiff’s preference
for a particular legal system’s substantive and procedural law but also
on the court access and choice-of-law decisions of courts. After all,
those decisions will determine whether a plaintiff will be able to ob-
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30
Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 719, 724 (2009). Ordinarily, domestic courts apply domestic procedural law
without making a choice-of-law decision. EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 128
(4th ed. 2004).
31
See Ralph U. Whitten, U.S. Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine and Forum Shopping, International
and Domestic (Revisited), 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 559, 567–68 (2002) (noting the impact of choiceof-law doctrine on international forum shopping and arguing that it is stronger than the
impact on domestic forum shopping). In addition to the relatively simple relationship
between choice of law and forum shopping described here, there can be more complex
forum shopping behavior, such as where a plaintiff selects a court because its choice-of-law
rules point to the preferred substantive law of another legal system.
32
Cf. Ghei & Parisi, supra note 25, at 1372 (“[T]he certainty of knowing that forum
law will always apply could . . . encourag[e] forum shopping.”).
33
Cf. ROBERT COVER, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 51, 58–59
(Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992) (describing “strategic behavior entailed in forum shopping”). Strategic behavior occurs when one actor’s ability to further his or her goals depends on how other actors behave. Under these conditions, each actor’s decisions must
take into account the expected actions of those other actors. See David A. Lake & Robert
Powell, International Relations: A Strategic-Choice Approach, in STRATEGIC CHOICE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 3, 3–6 (David A. Lake & Robert Powell eds., 1999) (noting that “choices
. . . are frequently strategic; that is, each actor’s ability to further its ends depends on how
other actors behave, and therefore each actor must take the actions of others into account”). Thus, the strategic behavior of an actor is a function not only of that actor’s
preferences but also of that actor’s expectations about the behavior of other relevant
actors.
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tain the substantive and procedural benefits of her preferred legal system. If the court decides to deny access, the plaintiff will not be able
to pursue her claim in that court at all; if the court allows access but
decides not to apply its own domestic substantive law, she will not secure the benefits of that law.
Generalizing from Weinberg’s concept,34 I define a forum shopping system as those features of a legal system that influence levels of
forum shopping into that system by shaping plaintiffs’ expectations of
favorable court access and choice-of-law decisions. According to strategic choice theory, an actor’s expectations about the behavior of another actor are based largely on inferences about the other actor’s
future behavior drawn from that other actor’s past behavior.35 For
this reason, strategic behavior is largely a function of available information about the past behavior of other actors. In forum shopping,
this information includes published court access and choice-of-law decisions.36 By publishing such decisions—either in official reporters or
in widely available electronic databases such as LexisNexis or
Westlaw—a court signals how it likely will decide similar future cases,
influencing plaintiffs’ expectations of favorable court access and
choice-of-law decisions.37 Thus, the key features of a forum shopping
system may include not only prominent published opinions but also
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34
See Weinberg, supra note 9, at 68 (“What has evolved seems to be a forum shopping
system. The plaintiff can sue the defendant in any number of states having ‘minimum
contacts’ with, or general jurisdiction over, the defendant . . . [and] [t]he forum is free to
apply its own law to any issue it has some interest in governing.” (footnotes omitted)).
35
See Lake & Powell, supra note 33, at 9 (observing that without knowing how the
other party will act, “the [actor] has to base her decision on the [other party’s] past
behavior”).
36
Court decisions are not necessarily the only source of information. Repeat players
may develop intuitions based on their own direct litigation experience, regardless of publication, with these intuitions giving repeat players an advantage over other parties in transnational litigation. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–104 (1974) (discussing the advantages of repeat players in litigation).
37
In the United States, most court decisions are not published. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119, 125–26 (2002)
(explaining that published decisions are a small percentage of total court decisions and are
not necessarily representative of unpublished decisions). Unpublished decisions are, of
course, important and known to the parties to the particular suits in which courts make the
decisions. However, because parties beyond these particular suits are unlikely to have
widespread knowledge of these decisions, unpublished decisions are unlikely to be as important as published decisions in shaping the expectations of plaintiffs in general. See
Hillel Y. Levin, Making the Law: Unpublication in the District Courts, 53 VILL. L. REV. 973, 988
(2008) (“[Unpublished] opinions cannot be systematically reviewed and researched without immense resources.”); Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Court of Appeals Decisions: A Hard
Look at the Process, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67, 96 (2004) (noting that “‘[a]n unpublished
disposition is, more or less, a letter from the court to parties familiar with the
facts’ . . . [and] ‘is not written in a way that will be fully intelligible to those unfamiliar with
the case’” (quoting Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1176, 1178 (9th Cir. 2001))).
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more general patterns of court access and choice-of-law decision making in published decisions.
In summary, forum shopping is a form of strategic behavior that
depends, among other things, on expectations about favorable court
access and choice-of-law decisions. A forum shopping system refers to
those features of a legal system—including published court decisions—that affect levels of litigation in that system by shaping plaintiffs’ expectations of favorable court access and choice-of-law
decisions. A forum shopping system affects transnational litigation
levels because, other things being equal, the higher plaintiffs’ expectations of favorable court access and choice-of-law decisions by courts in
a particular legal system, the more lawsuits plaintiffs will file there.
II
THE FORUM SHOPPING SYSTEM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: THE
CONVENTIONAL UNDERSTANDING
Using the theoretical framework developed in Part I, this Part explains the conventional understanding of the American forum shopping system and its consequences for transnational litigation in the
United States. According to this understanding, the system has two
key features that encourage plaintiffs to file transnational suits in U.S.
courts: a permissive approach to personal jurisdiction (which fosters
high expectations of favorable court access decisions) and pro-domestic-law bias in choice-of-law decision making (which creates high expectations of favorable choice-of-law decisions).38 This system is said
to have contributed to a transnational litigation explosion.39

When making forum shopping decisions, plaintiffs involved in
transnational disputes will often prefer to litigate in the United
States40 because the substantive and procedural laws of the United
States often are more favorable to plaintiffs than those of other countries.41 Substantively, U.S. law is “more likely than foreign law to allow
recovery and allow it for more elements of harm.”42 For example, the
United States offers not only theories of strict liability but also punitive
38
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See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
40
See Weintraub, supra note 26, at 323–24 (explaining reasons for this preference).
41
See Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, Lex Loci Delictus and Global Economic Welfare: Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 120 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1137 (2007) (“The substantive tort law and related procedural mechanisms available in U.S. courts are generally
much more favorable to plaintiffs, and produce much larger recoveries, than the law and
procedures available in foreign courts.”).
42
Weintraub, supra note 26, at 323; see also Whitten, supra note 31, at 567 (comparing
foreign “substantive law of liability or remedies that is either anti-recovery or that would
39
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damages.43 Procedurally, the United States offers advantages including liberal pretrial discovery, trial by jury, contingency fee arrangements, and the so-called “American rule,” whereby a losing plaintiff
ordinarily is not liable for the defendant’s attorney fees.44 Together,
these substantive and procedural advantages for plaintiffs purportedly
make the United States a “magnet forum,” a forum that “attract[s] the
aggrieved and injured of the world.”45
However, as indicated by the theory of forum shopping developed in Part I, forum shopping behavior depends not only on plaintiffs’ substantive and procedural law preferences but also on their
expectations about court access decisions and choice-of-law decisions—expectations that the forum shopping system shapes.46 According to the conventional understanding, two features of the
American forum shopping system encourage transnational forum
shopping into U.S. courts by raising plaintiffs’ expectations that U.S.
courts will grant them court access and give them the benefits of
favorable U.S. substantive and procedural rules: a permissive approach to personal jurisdiction and a pro-domestic-law bias in choiceof-law decision making.
1. Court Access
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allow a lower recovery compared to U.S. law” with U.S. courts that will apply “pro-recovery
rules”).
43
See Russell J. Weintraub, Choice of Law for Products Liability: Demagnetizing the United
States Forum, 52 ARK. L. REV. 157, 163 (1999) (noting advantages of strict liability and punitive damages in the United States).
44
See Weintraub, supra note 26 (discussing these advantages); see also Silberman, supra
note 16, at 502 (“Courts in the United States attract plaintiffs, both foreign and resident,
because they offer procedural advantages beyond those of foreign forums . . . .”).
45
Weintraub, supra note 6, at 463; see also BELL, supra note 5, at 28 (calling the United
States “a forum shopper’s delight”).
46
See supra Part I.
47
95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).
48
See id. (“[N]o State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or
property without its territory.”). Courts did not require territorial presence when there was
express or implied consent of the defendant. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 106 (4th ed. 2005). Eventually, the concept of implied consent developed into “a
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The first feature of the American forum shopping system is said
to be a permissive approach to personal jurisdiction. One can best
understand this feature by comparing it to an earlier approach to personal jurisdiction that was based on the Supreme Court’s 1878 decision in Pennoyer v. Neff.47 In Pennoyer, the Supreme Court adopted a
strict territorial approach to personal jurisdiction that provided for
two primary grounds of jurisdiction over nonconsenting foreign defendants: seizure of the defendant’s property within the forum state’s
territory or service of process on the defendant within the forum
state’s territory.48 Under this approach, a plaintiff ordinarily could
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pursue litigation against a nonconsenting defendant only in those
U.S. states in which the defendant either had property or could be
served—and if no such states existed, the plaintiff would not have access to any U.S. court to sue the defendant.49 The ruling in Pennoyer
thus “created a system in which . . . a plaintiff’s choice of forum was
severely limited.”50
The current U.S. approach to personal jurisdiction—derived
from the Supreme Court’s 1945 decision in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington51—is considerably more permissive than its approach
under Pennoyer.52 In International Shoe, the Court held that
due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.”53

Thus, physical presence of the defendant’s property or person in the
forum state’s territory is no longer required.54
This approach makes it easier for a plaintiff to establish personal
jurisdiction over a defendant even when the defendant is outside the
United States, even when the activity that gave rise to the dispute occurred outside the United States, and regardless of whether the plain-

C M
Y K

R

03/02/2011 13:01:08

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1596280

R

29417_crn_96-3 Sheet No. 32 Side B

major means of asserting in-personam jurisdiction over a mobile, business citizenry when a
strict application of territorial jurisdiction premised on physical presence would have precluded jurisdiction.” Id. at 111.
49
As William Richman and William Reynolds explain:
Absent in-state service, courts upheld jurisdiction over non-domiciliary natural persons only if they could infer consent from the defendant’s engaging
in activities that were closely regulated by the state. If defendant caused
personal or economic injury as a result of simply travelling through the
state or engaging in unregulated business activity in the state, the state
courts could not compel him to appear and defend. The resident plaintiff
was forced to travel to defendant’s home to litigate.
The ability of the territorial theory to reach the corporate defendant
was similarly limited; if the corporation was not doing business locally, the
state could not exercise jurisdiction. “Doing business” meant activity of a
systematic and continuous nature, but a corporation by dint of a modern
chain of distribution could derive very substantial economic benefit from a
state without doing business there.
WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS 29 (3d
ed. 2002) (footnotes omitted).
50
Stein, supra note 27, at 802.
51
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
52
See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) (“The immediate effect of this
departure from Pennoyer’s conceptual apparatus was to increase the ability of the state
courts to obtain personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.”); VON MEHREN, supra
note 19, at 399 (arguing that “American jurisdictional theory became even more embracive
and, in the view of some, more aggressive” after International Shoe).
53
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
54
See id. (allowing for jurisdiction even “if [defendant] be not present within the
territory of the forum”).
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tiff is a U.S. or foreign citizen.55 For example, under the theory of
specific jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction may be based on slight contacts with a U.S. state’s territory if those contacts are related to the
plaintiff’s claim.56 And under the theory of general jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction may exist in a U.S. state even if the defendant’s contacts with that state are unrelated to the plaintiff’s claim provided that
those contacts are sufficiently extensive.57
A plaintiff can access the substantive and procedural advantages
of the U.S. legal system only if a U.S. court has personal jurisdiction
over the defendant.58 The United States’ permissive approach to personal jurisdiction increases the likelihood that a plaintiff will have access to these advantages, thereby encouraging plaintiffs to file
transnational lawsuits in U.S. courts.59
2. Choice of Law
According to the conventional understanding, the second feature
of the forum shopping system is strong pro-domestic-law bias in
choice-of-law decision making. Until the 1950s, territoriality dominated choice of law just as it had dominated personal jurisdiction.
Joseph Story’s influential Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, pub-
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55
See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 41, at 1144 (noting that “U.S. firms and firms
with close U.S. connections can be sued in U.S. courts for torts committed outside the
United States”); Linda J. Silberman, The Impact of Jurisdictional Rules and Recognition Practice
on International Business Transactions: The U.S. Regime, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 327, 336 (2004)
(noting that “multinational defendants with offices or extensive activities in the United
States can be sued here even on claims that bear no relationship to the activities in the
United States”).
56
See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 48, at 129–30.
57
See id.
58
Without personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff’s transnational lawsuit is subject to dismissal. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2).
59
See VON MEHREN, supra note 19, at 191 (“The analysis employed [in International
Shoe] increases the number of available forums, with the result that ordinarily a plaintiff’s
forum is produced.”); Juenger, supra note 13, at 557 (arguing that International Shoe “enhanced the potential for forum shopping” because it was “intended to expand rather than
to constrict” personal jurisdiction); Peter Huber, Courts of Convenience or Have Lawsuit, Will
Travel, REGULATION, Sept./Oct. 1985, at 18, 20 (arguing that International Shoe’s minimumcontacts test allows many large corporations to “be sued everywhere”). Some litigants and
interest groups use this logic as part of their legal strategies. For example, in Goodyear
Luxembourg Tires, S.A. v. Brown, now pending before the Supreme Court, the petitioners
and their amici curiae supporters are using claims about permissive personal jurisdiction
and its impact on forum shopping to argue for a more restrictive approach to general
jurisdiction in transnational product liability actions. See Brief for Petitioners at 9, Goodyear,
No. 10-76 (U.S. Nov. 19, 2010), 2010 WL 4624153 at *9 (arguing that approving North
Carolina’s approach to general jurisdiction—based on which it asserted jurisdiction over
petitioners—would be an “invitation to rampant forum shopping”); Brief of the Org. for
Int’l Inv. & Ass’n of Int’l Auto. Mfrs. Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 16,
Goodyear, No. 10-76 (U.S. Nov. 19, 2010), 2010 WL 4803149 at *16 (asserting that “[t]he
U.S. legal system has had a problem with forum shopping” and that affirming the state
court’s decision “would dramatically expand opportunities for forum shopping”).
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lished in 1834, began with the premise that the laws of each state bind
persons within that state’s territory but not beyond.60 To justify a domestic court’s application of foreign law, Story relied on a theory of
comity.61 The reporter for the American Law Institute’s 1934 First
Restatement of Conflict of Laws, Joseph Beale, adopted Story’s territorial approach but rejected the theory of comity in favor of a theory of
vested rights to justify the application of foreign law by a domestic
court.62 Reflecting Beale’s twin principles of territoriality and vested
rights, the First Restatement’s general choice-of-law rule for tort cases
was that a court should apply “the law of the place of wrong.”63 The
First Restatement defines the “place of wrong” as “the state where the
last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes
place.”64 Usually this was the location where the plaintiff was injured
since liability does not arise without injury.65 For contract cases, the
rule was that the law of the place of contracting should apply.66 The
First Restatement’s territorial choice-of-law rules are widely understood to have limited the substantive-law incentive for plaintiffs to forum shop into U.S. courts.67 After all, “[i]t would do the plaintiff no
good to sue in a forum with favorable domestic law if a court there
would apply the law of some other jurisdiction.”68
However, beginning in the 1950s, U.S. courts increasingly discarded the classic territorial approaches to choice of law embodied in
Story’s Commentaries and the First Restatement; instead, courts began
replacing them with various modern choice-of-law methods,69 the
most prominent of which is the “most significant relationship”
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60
See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 7 (Boston, Hilliard,
Gray, & Co. 1834) (“It is plain, that the laws of one country can have no intrinsic
force . . . except within the territorial limits and jurisdiction of that country.”).
61
Id. at 7–8 (“Whatever extra-territorial force [a nation’s laws] are to have, is the
result, not of any original power to extend them abroad, but of that respect, which from
motives of public policy other nations are disposed to yield to them . . . .”); see also SCOLES
ET AL., supra note 30, at 18–20 (describing this approach and noting that it “was generally
accepted as an operational theory in the courts during the half century from 1850–1900”).
62
See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 30, at 20–21 (explaining Beale’s vested-rights theory).
63
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377–378 (1934).
64
Id. § 377.
65
SCOLES ET AL., supra note 30, at 713.
66
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 311.
67
See Ghei & Parisi, supra note 25, at 1374 (arguing that, in theory at least, “[a]s long
as the rules [of the First Restatement] are applied consistently, the same substantive law
should apply to identical facts, resulting in identical outcomes . . . [and that t]his rulesbased system would eliminate forum shopping by ensuring uniform and predictable results.”). But see Juenger, supra note 13, at 559 (noting the anti-forum shopping purpose of
a place-of-wrong approach but arguing that various “escape devices” enabled judges to
deviate from strict territoriality, thus diluting its anti-forum-shopping effects).
68
Weintraub, supra note 26, at 323.
69
See generally RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 49, at 180 (noting that the traditional
First Restatement choice-of-law system “prevailed in most American courts until the work
of a new generation of judges and scholars began to supplant it in the [1950s] and
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method set forth in the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws.70
Rather than emphasizing a single territorial connecting factor—as was
the case under the First Restatement—the modern approaches generally involve more flexible multifactor tests.71
According to choice-of-law scholars, this “choice-of-law revolution” gave rise to a strong bias in favor of applying domestic law.72
This bias is said to be the second key feature of the forum shopping
system. As one leading choice-of-law scholar argues, the modern approaches have an “inherent forum law preference.”73 As another puts
it, “if [plaintiffs’ attorneys] are competent they will at least be generally aware that the U.S. court selected will apply a modern conflicts
approach that has . . . pro-forum, pro-recovery tendencies . . . .”74
This pro-domestic-law bias purportedly encourages transnational forum shopping into U.S. courts by raising plaintiffs’ expectations that
judges will apply plaintiff-favoring U.S. substantive law in transnational
litigation.75
B. The Transnational Litigation Explosion
By encouraging plaintiffs to file transnational lawsuits in U.S.
courts, the American forum shopping system is said to have combined
with the process of globalization to create a transnational litigation
explosion.76 Globalization entails increasingly numerous transna-
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[1960s]”). For a leading account of this revolution, see generally SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES,
THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (2006).
70
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971).
71
See Whytock, supra note 30, at 725–28 (describing these modern methods).
72
See, e.g., SCOLES ET AL., supra note 30, at 107 (noting “homeward trend” in American choice of law); Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 41, at 1137 (“[C]ompared to the lex loci
rule, the modern rules have one unmistakable consequence: they make it more likely that
the forum court will apply local tort law to wrongs that occurred in another jurisdiction.”);
Whitten, supra note 31, at 560 (arguing that “[b]oth the empirical evidence and the existing scholarly consensus . . . indicate that there is a strong tendency under all modern
conflicts systems to apply forum law”); see also SYMEONIDES, supra note 69, at 334 (noting
“widely held assumption” that courts applying modern methods have strong pro-forum-law
bias).
73
FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 148 (spec. ed.
2005).
74
Whitten, supra note 31, at 568.
75
See Juenger, supra note 13, at 558 (arguing that modern choice-of-law methods’
forum-law tendency “present[s] yet another incentive to the forum shopper”); Whitten,
supra note 31 (describing the impact of pro-domestic-law bias on transnational forum
shopping).
76
See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347,
2365 (1991) (referring to the post-1970s “explosion of transnational commercial litigation
in United States courts” (emphasis omitted)); Waller, supra note 4, at 102 (noting “explosive growth of transnational litigation” in U.S. courts); John Bies, Comment, Conditioning
Forum Non Conveniens, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 489, 489 (2000) (noting the “explosion of international civil litigation in U.S. courts”).
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tional interactions.77 More transnational interactions give rise to
more transnational disputes.78 And plaintiffs purportedly bring a disproportionately large number of these disputes to U.S. courts because
the American forum shopping system promises them access to
favorable U.S. substantive and procedural laws.79 The theory of forum
shopping presented in Part I supports this logic: the permissive approach to personal jurisdiction should create high expectations of
favorable court access decisions, and the pro-domestic-law bias should
create high expectations of favorable choice-of-law decisions, thus encouraging plaintiffs to file transnational claims in U.S. courts.
Thus, many observers assume that transnational litigation in U.S.
courts is increasing.80 As one observer puts it, “certain facts on the
ground are clear: [i]n recent decades, litigation in U.S. courts with a
foreign or international component has been growing in volume and
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77
Cf. DAVID HELD & ANTHONY MCGREW, GLOBALIZATION/ANTI-GLOBALIZATION 1
(2002) (defining globalization as “expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding up and
deepening impact of transcontinental flows and patterns of social interaction”).
78
See BELL, supra note 5, at 4 (“Quite simply, more international trade means more
transnational disputes, contractual, quasi-contractual, and arising from the negligent provision of goods and services.”); David W. Robertson, The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens: “An Object Lesson in Uncontrolled Discretion,” 29 TEX. INT’L L.J. 353, 367–68 (1994)
(“[D]evelopments in industrial, communications, and transportation technology have facilitated international activity, which in turn has multiplied the number of international
disputes.”); Frank Eric Marchetti, Comment, Alienage Jurisdiction over Stateless Corporations:
Revealing the Folly of Matimak Trading Company v. Khalily, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 249, 250
(1999) (“One unavoidable consequence of increased interaction between citizens of the
United States and . . . foreign businesses will be an increase in legal disputes involving
parties from foreign countries.”).
79
See Sykes, supra note 10, at 339 (“Plaintiffs regularly bring tort and tortlike cases in
U.S. courts seeking damages for harms that have occurred abroad, attracted by higher
expected returns than are available in the jurisdiction in which the harm arose.”); Weintraub, supra note 6, at 463 (describing the United States as “first among the world’s magnet
forums”).
80
See, e.g., Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S.
Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 552 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (noting that “transnational litigation is increasing”); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an
International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 441–42 (2003) (stating that “with the
‘globalization’ of any number of aspects of human endeavor—commerce, communications
including the Internet, crime, human rights—the importance of transnational issues in
national courts has grown,” and that “the number of cases with transnational elements has
also continued to increase ”); Eugene J. Silva, Practical Views on Stemming the Tide of Foreign
Plaintiffs and Concluding Mid-Atlantic Settlements, 28 TEX. INT’L L.J. 479, 480 (1993) (“Over
the last fifteen years . . . multinational litigation has demonstrated particularly sustained
growth.”); Molly M. White, Home Field Advantage: The Exploitation of Federal Forum Non Conveniens by United States Corporations and Its Effects on International Environmental Litigation, 26
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 491, 493 (1993) (“As the world has become more interdependent, the
amount of litigation between foreign citizens and United States nationals also has escalated.”). In prior scholarship, I also made this assumption. See Whytock, supra note 21, at
74 (noting that “legal scholars speculate that globalization and the intensifying transnational interactions it entails have caused transnational litigation to grow in recent
decades”).
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also in complexity.”81 According to another, “the last thirty years have
seen a growing torrent of cases with international and foreign issues.”82 Although both U.S. plaintiffs and foreign plaintiffs can forum
shop transnational claims into U.S. courts, some commentators focus
specifically on the latter.83 For example, one scholar describes a “tide
of foreign plaintiffs against United States shores.”84 According to another, “[t]he number of lawsuits filed in the United States by foreign
plaintiffs against U.S. corporations has increased considerably over
the past fifteen years.”85
III
THE FORUM SHOPPING SYSTEM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: A
NEW UNDERSTANDING
The conventional understanding of the American forum shopping system and its consequences is highly plausible. However, perhaps precisely because of its plausibility, it has largely escaped
empirical scrutiny.86 This Part empirically evaluates the conventional
understanding and finds that it is no longer accurate. This Part therefore provides a new and more up-to-date understanding of the American forum shopping system and its impact on transnational litigation
in U.S. courts. It argues that the forum shopping system has evolved
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81
Paul R. Dubinsky, The Future of Transnational Litigation in U.S. Courts: Distinct Field or
Footnote?, 101 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 365, 366 (2007).
82
HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS v
(2008).
83
See, e.g., John M. Barcus, Money (It’s What They Want): Quantifying Damage Awards for
Foreign Tort Victims in United States Admiralty Courts, 21 REV. LITIG. 635, 658 (2002) (noting
but not necessarily agreeing with the claim that there is a “tidal wave of foreign plaintiffs
clogging up the dockets in our courts”); Douglas W. Dunham & Eric F. Gladbach, Forum
Non Conveniens and Foreign Plaintiffs in the 1990s, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 665, 665–66 (1999)
(claiming that number of product-liability claims filed by foreign plaintiffs in U.S. courts
increased in the 1990s); Paul G. Cereghini & John D. Sear, Huddled Masses Yearning to Strike
It Rich: Foreign Plaintiffs Shopping for Gold in American Courts, LAW.COM (July 17, 2009), http:/
/www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202432312841 (“With increased frequency, American
companies conducting operations abroad face lawsuits in American courts by foreign
plaintiffs seeking the benefits of the American system of justice.”); Global Forum Shopping,
supra note 15 (identifying “global forum shopping” as a “disturbing new trend in which
foreign plaintiffs take advantage of the unusually expansive features of the American judicial system to file lawsuits in U.S. courts”); John Niblock, Obscure Statute Has Prompted Flood
of Foreign Claims in U.S. Courts, ROLL CALL (Sept. 3, 2003), http://www.rollcall.com/features/Global-Trade_2003/global_trade/2661-1.html (claiming that “U.S. plaintiffs’ lawyers
are crowding U.S. court dockets with product liability, environmental tort, unfair wage,
and human rights claims on behalf of hundreds of thousands of foreign plaintiffs”).
84
Silva, supra note 80, at 481.
85
Don Mayer & Kyle Sable, Yes! We Have No Bananas: Forum Non Conveniens and
Corporate Evasion, 4 INT’L BUS. L. REV. 130, 131 (2004).
86
In fact, there is a general lack of empirical analysis of forum shopping and its consequences. See Juenger, supra note 13, at 553–54 (noting the absence of “in-depth study,
empirical or otherwise, that focuses on [forum shopping]”).
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in a manner that no longer encourages transnational forum shopping
into U.S. courts to the extent it supposedly once did; and, contrary to
claims that there is a transnational litigation explosion, it demonstrates that at least one important form of transnational litigation—
alienage litigation—has actually been decreasing.
A. The Current Forum Shopping System
The conventional understanding of the American forum shopping system is based largely on developments that took place decades
ago, particularly the Supreme Court’s 1945 decision in International
Shoe and the American choice-of-law revolution that began in the
1950s.87 In this subpart, I use a combination of doctrinal and empirical analysis to update our understanding of the American forum shopping system. Specifically, I identify two key differences between the
current American forum shopping system and the system described by
the conventional understanding. First, by aggressively using the forum non conveniens doctrine to dismiss transnational litigation, the
U.S. district courts have significantly offset the incentives that permissive personal jurisdiction created. Second, there no longer appears to
be a pro-domestic-law bias in international choice-of-law decision making. The evidence indicates that the American forum shopping system has evolved in a direction that has made it less likely to encourage
transnational forum shopping into U.S. courts than it supposedly
once did.
1. Court Access

87
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See supra Part II.A.
See Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie, 61 STAN. L. REV. 971, 985 (2009)
(referring to the doctrine as “strange and understudied”); Silberman, supra note 55, at 341
(noting that the “doctrine of forum non conveniens occupies a central role in international
litigation”).
89
For some of the best scholarship on the forum non conveniens doctrine, see generally Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 77 TUL. L. REV.
309 (2002); Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction
on the Frontier of the Inherent Power, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1147 (2006); David W. Robertson, Forum
Non Conveniens in America and England: “A Rather Fantastic Fiction,” 103 LAW Q. REV. 398
(1987); Stein, supra note 27; and Weintraub, supra note 26.
88
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A key feature of the current American forum shopping system is
the forum non conveniens doctrine. Although this doctrine is relatively obscure and often neglected, it plays a central role in transnational litigation.88 Existing forum non conveniens scholarship is
largely doctrinal and emphasizes the implications of the doctrine for
litigants after they have filed their lawsuits.89 In contrast, my goal here
is to highlight the signals sent by U.S. federal courts in their forum
non conveniens decisions and the impact of those signals on transna-
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tional forum shopping behavior—that is, on the decisions of plaintiffs
to file transnational suits in U.S. courts in the first place. Specifically,
I argue that U.S. federal courts have signaled that they will aggressively use the forum non conveniens doctrine to dismiss transnational
litigation when they deem a foreign court to be a more appropriate
forum. This signal offsets the incentive created by the forum shopping system’s permissive approach to personal jurisdiction by lowering
expectations of court access, thus reducing plaintiffs’ incentives to file
transnational claims in U.S. courts.
Under the forum non conveniens doctrine, a U.S. district court
may dismiss a transnational suit “on the ground that a court abroad is
the more appropriate and convenient forum for adjudicating the controversy.”90 It may do so even if it has subject matter jurisdiction and
personal jurisdiction; in fact, it may do so without even determining
whether it has jurisdiction.91 However, dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds is not permitted unless the proposed foreign court
provides an adequate alternative forum.92 The adequacy requirement
is ordinarily satisfied unless the defendant is not amenable to process
in the foreign jurisdiction or in “rare circumstances . . . where the
remedy offered by the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory.”93 To
guide judges’ forum non conveniens decisions, the Supreme Court
has specified a variety of private and public interest factors. The former relate to the convenience of the litigants94 while the latter relate
to the convenience of the court.95
90

Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007).
See id. (holding that “a court need not resolve whether it has . . . subject-matter
jurisdiction[ ] or personal jurisdiction” before dismissing on forum non conveniens
grounds).
92
See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254–55 (1981) (describing the
adequate-alternative-forum requirement).
93
Id. at 254 n.22. For example, “dismissal would not be appropriate where the alternative forum does not permit litigation of the subject matter of the dispute.” Id.
94
These “private interest” factors include:
relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process
for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing,
witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the
action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.
Id. at 241 n.6 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)).
95
These “public interest” factors include:
the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the “local interest in having localized controversies decided at home”; the interest in
having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the law
that must govern the action; the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws, or in the application of foreign law; and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty.
Id. (quoting Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 509).
91
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The Supreme Court’s seminal forum non conveniens cases were
decided in 1947 and involved domestic litigation.96 Until the 1980s,
“the federal courts confronted only a handful of international forum
non conveniens disputes.”97 Moreover, during this period, the lower
courts took a restrictive “abuse of process” approach to the forum non
conveniens doctrine, according to which they generally would refuse
to dismiss the action unless the defendant would be “‘unfairly
prejudiced’ or ‘deprived of substantial justice’ by being tried in the
United States.”98 Simply put, the doctrine was rarely used in transnational litigation and, when used, dismissal was unlikely.99
This changed in 1981. That year, the Supreme Court in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno specifically applied the forum non conveniens doctrine to dismiss a transnational claim.100 Piper’s key holdings were
twofold. First, “dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens may be
granted even though the law applicable in the alternative forum is less
favorable to the plaintiff’s chance of recovery” than the law applicable
in the U.S. court.101 The Court explicitly linked this holding to a pol-
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96
Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 501; Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
In fact, the forum non conveniens doctrine can be traced back even earlier to admiralty
cases. See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens as Applied in the
Federal Courts in Matters of Admiralty: An Object Lesson in Uncontrolled Discretion, 35 CORNELL
L.Q. 12 (1949) (discussing the admiralty origins of the doctrine). In domestic litigation in
the federal court system, decisions once made under the forum non conveniens doctrine
are now made under the federal transfer rules. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2006).
97
Robertson, supra note 78, at 370.
98
Robertson, supra note 89, at 403 (footnotes omitted).
99
See id. (noting that “[o]nly a handful of reported decisions resulted in forum non
conveniens dismissals” during this period).
100
454 U.S. 235 (1981) (applying forum non conveniens doctrine to the suit of Scottish real parties in interest against U.S. defendants arising out of an air crash in Scotland);
see VON MEHREN, supra note 19, at 319 (noting that “the Court [in Piper] approved the use
of the [forum non conveniens] doctrine by federal courts in international cases”). In addition to Piper, there were two personal-jurisdiction decisions by the Supreme Court in the
1980s involving transnational litigation, both of which resulted in dismissal of a transnational suit filed in a U.S. court against a foreign defendant. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408 (1984). These prominent personal-jurisdiction decisions may also have contributed to the signal that the U.S. federal courts would be less likely than before to grant
court access for transnational suits. The Supreme Court’s recent reinvigoration of the presumption against the extraterritorial application of legislation, and its use of that presumption to dismiss a transnational securities fraud suit, might also be considered part of this
trend. Morrison v. Nat’t Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). A decision by the Court
in Goodyear Luxembourg Tires, S.A. v. Brown to reverse a North Carolina court’s assertion of
general jurisdiction in a transnational product liability case would contribute further to
this trend. See Brown v. Meter, 695 S.E.2d 756 (N.C. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. Goodyear
Lux. Tires, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 63 (2010) (No. 10-76).
101
Piper, 454 U.S. at 250. However, the Court clarified:
We do not hold that the possibility of an unfavorable change in law should
never be a relevant consideration in a forum non conveniens inquiry. Of
course, if the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, the unfavorable change in
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icy of deterring transnational forum shopping into U.S. courts: because plaintiffs shop for the forum with the most favorable law, a
dismissal to a different court will almost inevitably entail a change to
less favorable law.102 Therefore, if dismissal were allowed only in the
absence of such a change, “dismissal would rarely be proper”103 and
“American courts, which are already extremely attractive to foreign
plaintiffs, would become even more attractive. The flow of litigation
into the United States would increase and further congest already
crowded courts.”104
The second key holding in Piper differentiates between domestic
and foreign plaintiffs. While there is “ordinarily a strong presumption
in favor of the plaintiff’s choice of forum,” a foreign plaintiff’s choice
“deserves less deference” than that of a U.S. plaintiff.105 The Court
explained:
When the home forum has been chosen, it is reasonable to assume
that this choice is convenient. When the plaintiff is foreign, however, this assumption is much less reasonable. Because the central
purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the trial
is convenient, a foreign plaintiff’s choice deserves less deference.106
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law may be given substantial weight; the district court may conclude that
dismissal would not be in the interests of justice.
Id. at 254. According to the Court, this will only be the case in “rare circumstances.” Id. at
254 n.22.
102
Id. at 250.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 252 (footnote omitted).
105
Id. at 255–56.
106
Id.
107
See Robertson, supra note 89, at 405.
108
Id. at 399.
109
See Robertson, supra note 78, at 370.
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Thus, according to Piper, the plaintiff’s citizenship is, in effect, a proxy
for convenience.
As David Robertson argues, the Court in Piper essentially replaced
the abuse-of-process approach to forum non conveniens with a more
aggressive “most suitable forum” approach.107 The endorsement of
this approach gave the lower courts “much broader discretion to decline jurisdiction,” allowing them to dismiss transnational litigation
“whenever it appeared to the court on balance . . . that trial elsewhere
would . . . be more appropriate.”108 In addition, the lower courts “began seeing a large number of international forum non conveniens
cases” after the Piper decision.109
As explained above, the key features of a forum shopping system
include not only prominent precedents—like Piper—but also broader
patterns of court decisions that send signals that can influence plain-
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tiffs’ expectations about court access.110 What signals do the lower
courts send in their published forum non conveniens decisions? Prior
studies describe a signal that “the vast majority of forum non conveniens motions [will be] granted by the federal courts”111 and that
“[f]oreign plaintiffs . . . [will] find their claims almost uniformly dismissed.”112 However, these studies did not employ random sampling,
and they relied on only a small number of decisions.113
To obtain more reliable estimates, I created a data set consisting
of a random sample of more than 200 published forum non conveniens decisions by U.S. district court judges between 1990 and
2005.114 I then created the variable Decision, and for each case, I
coded it as 1 (motion granted) if the court granted the motion to
dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds and 0 (motion denied) if
the court denied the motion. I also coded each case to indicate
whether the plaintiffs were all domestic, mixed, or foreign.
According to my analysis, published U.S. district court decisions
signal that judges will aggressively use the forum non conveniens doctrine to dismiss transnational litigation. However, the signal is not as
discouraging to plaintiffs as the prior studies suggest. As Table 1 indicates, the U.S. district courts dismiss transnational claims on forum
non conveniens grounds at an estimated rate of 47.1% in their published decisions, with 95% confidence that the actual dismissal rate is
between 40.5% and 53.9% (hereinafter, I indicate estimates and their
95% confidence intervals as follows: 47.1% [40.5, 53.9]).115 Dismissal
110

See supra Part I.
Elizabeth T. Lear, Federalism, Forum Shopping, and the Foreign Injury Paradox, 51 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 87, 101 (2009); see also David W. Robertson & Paula K. Speck, Access to State
Courts in Transnational Personal Injury Cases: Forum Non Conveniens and Antisuit Injunctions,
68 TEX. L. REV. 937, 940 (1990) (claiming that the forum non conveniens doctrine “effectively closes the federal courts” to most transnational personal injury litigation and that
“forum non conveniens has led to the dismissal of most federal-court actions brought on
behalf of transnational personal injury victims”).
112
Elizabeth T. Lear, National Interests, Foreign Injuries, and Federal Forum Non Conveniens, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 559, 561 (2007).
113
See id. at 568 n.49, 570 n.58 (listing forty-four cases upon which estimates were
based); Robertson & Speck, supra note 111, at 940 n.19 (citing only one case in support of
the proposition that forum non conveniens has led to the dismissal of “most” transnational
personal injury cases). Random sampling is a standard technique for reducing the risk of
selection bias. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 110
(2002) (explaining how random sampling avoids selection bias).
114
I generated the sample in three steps: First, I searched the LexisNexis Academic
database of U.S. district court decisions for the term “forum non conveniens” between
1990 and 2005. Second, I randomly sorted the results. Third, I analyzed each case in the
randomly generated order, discarding those decisions that were not actual decisions by
U.S. district court judges to either grant or deny a motion to dismiss in favor of a foreign
court on forum non conveniens grounds. I continued this process until I had a sample of
approximately 200 decisions (the exact number was 210).
115
Similarly, another recent study found that the dismissal rate in 769 forum non conveniens decisions published by the U.S. district courts between 1982 and 2006 was 52%.
111
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TABLE 1
CONVENIENS DECISIONS

Domestic
Plaintiffs

Mixed

Foreign
Plaintiffs

Total

Motion Denied

N=64
69.6%
[59.5, 78.1]

N=9
64.3%
[38.6, 83.8]

N=37
36.6%
[27.9, 46.4]

N=111
52.9%
[46.1, 59.5]

Motion Granted

N=28
30.4%
[21.9, 40.5]

N=5
35.7%
[16.2, 61.4]

N=64
63.4%
[53.6, 72.1]

N=99
47.1%
[40.5, 53.9]

N=92
100.0%

N=14
100.0%

N=101
100.0%

N=210
100.0%

Decision

Total

Notes: This table shows the number of motions to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds denied and granted by U.S. district court judges between 1990
and 2005 in my sample of published decisions. It also shows estimates of the percentage of motions denied and granted in the overall population of published forum non conveniens decisions. The figures in brackets are the lower and upper
bounds of each estimate’s 95% confidence interval. Due to lack of citizenship information for one case in which a forum non conveniens motion was denied and
for two cases in which a forum non conveniens motion was granted, the totals in
the far right column do not equal the sum of the number of observations in the
columns to the left.
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Michael T. Lii, An Empirical Examination of the Adequate Alternative Forum in the Doctrine of
Forum Non Conveniens, 8 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 513, 526 (2009). Two notes are in order
regarding the interpretation of these results: First, although published forum non conveniens decisions are likely to have the strongest influence on plaintiffs’ expectations of
court access, estimates based on those decisions may not accurately describe unpublished
forum non conveniens decisions. See supra Part I. Second, the overall dismissal rate approaches 50%—a tendency consistent with the so-called “50% hypothesis,” according to
which litigation win rates naturally converge on 50%. See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (developing
the 50% hypothesis). But see Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is Possible, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 493, 499–501 (1996) (arguing that the 50% plaintiff win rate is not a
“central tendency, either in theory or in fact”). Whether or not the 50% hypothesis explains why forum non conveniens dismissal rates approach 50%, the signal sent to plaintiffs
would seem to remain the same: dismissals are frequent, not rare.
116
549 U.S. 422 (2007); see Donald Earl Childress III, When Erie Goes International, 105
NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (finding that since 2007, the dismissal rate is 62%).
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rates appear to be even higher since the Supreme Court’s most recent
forum non conveniens opinion, Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia
International Shipping Corp.116
Table 1 also indicates that the dismissal rate for claims filed by
foreign plaintiffs (63.4% [53.6, 72.1]) is higher than the dismissal rate
for claims filed by domestic plaintiffs (30.4% [21.9, 40.5]). Given the
Supreme Court’s holding in Piper, the difference between dismissal
rates for domestic and foreign plaintiffs is doctrinally unsurprising.
However, the extent of the disparity between domestic and foreign
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plaintiffs is striking: the signal seems to be that foreign plaintiffs are
twice as likely to have their suits dismissed.
In summary, the court access component of the American forum
shopping system has evolved. Until 1981, the forum non conveniens
doctrine was infrequently used in transnational litigation. 117 When
used, courts applied it cautiously to dismiss cases only when necessary
to avoid an abuse of process.118 The permissive approach to personal
jurisdiction that emerged in the wake of International Shoe was thus left
largely unchecked, fostering high expectations of favorable court access decisions. The current system—a centerpiece of which is an aggressively applied forum non conveniens doctrine—is likely to foster
lower expectations of favorable court access decisions, thus reducing
the incentive to file transnational lawsuits in U.S. courts.
2. Choice of Law
The choice-of-law component of the American forum shopping
system has also evolved. According to the conventional understanding, strong pro-domestic-law bias in choice-of-law decision making
emerged in the wake of the American choice-of-law revolution.119
This bias is said to encourage transnational forum shopping into U.S.
courts by plaintiffs seeking favorable U.S. substantive law.120
But empirical analysis suggests that in the current forum shopping system, courts are sending a different signal. To perform this
analysis, I created a data set consisting of a random sample of more
than 125 published choice-of-law decisions by U.S. district court
judges in transnational tort cases between 1990 and 2005.121 I then
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See Robertson, supra note 78, at 370.
See Robertson, supra note 89, at 403.
119
See supra Part II.A.2.
120
Id.
121
I generated the sample in three steps: First, I searched the LexisNexis U.S. District
Court database for decisions between 1990 and 2005 in which a judge decided whether
domestic law or foreign law should apply to a tort claim. I used the following search query:
“([COUNTRY SEARCH TERM] w/3 law) w/200 ((choice or conflict or appli! or govern!)
w/2 law) and tort!” I used the first element of the query to identify cases involving foreign
law; I repeated the search for each country in the world, inserting appropriate country
search terms into the query. I used the second element of the query to limit the search to
choice-of-law decisions. The third element limited the search to tort cases. Second, I consolidated the results of these searches and randomly sorted them. Third, I analyzed each
case in the randomly generated order, discarding those that did not actually decide
whether domestic or foreign law should apply to a tort claim. I continued this process
until I had a sample of approximately 200 decisions (the exact number was 213). See
Whytock, supra note 30, at 755 nn. 187–88. I then also discarded 85 decisions made in the
context of a forum non conveniens analysis because these decisions are highly skewed in
favor of foreign law. See id. at 756. The result was a sample of 128 cases. Analysis of choiceof-law decisions in contract cases would likely be less illuminating because of the prevalence of choice-of-law clauses, which courts generally enforce. SCOLES ET AL., supra note 30,
at 947.
118
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created the variable Decision, and for each case, I coded it as 1 if the
court applied foreign law and 0 if the court applied U.S. law.
INTERNATIONAL
Law Applied
U.S. Law
Foreign Law
Total

TABLE 2
CHOICE-OF-LAW DECISIONS

Number of Decisions

Estimated Percentage

95% Confidence
Interval

71

55.5%

[46.8, 63.8]

57

44.5%

[36.2, 53.2]

128

100.0%

Notes: This table shows the number of decisions to apply U.S. and foreign law by
U.S. district court judges between 1990 and 2005 in my sample of published
choice-of-law decisions in transnational tort cases. It also shows estimates of the
percentage of decisions to apply U.S. law and foreign law in the overall population
of published choice-of-law decisions in transnational tort cases. The figures in
brackets are the lower and upper bounds of each estimate’s 95% confidence interval.
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122
See Whytock, supra note 30, at 765 tbl.2 (comparing pro-domestic-law and pro-foreign-law decision rates). Due to potential selection effects, the pro-forum-law decision
rates alone cannot conclusively demonstrate lack of bias. Therefore, in an earlier analysis I
applied methods to take these effects into account. See id. at 765–69 (describing these
methods and the resulting findings confirming lack of pro-forum-law bias). The notes
regarding interpretation of the forum non conveniens estimates, supra note 115, apply
equally to the choice-of-law estimates.
123
See Whytock, supra note 30, at 772.
124
See id. at 768 tbl.3.
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As Table 2 shows, in their published decisions—those most likely
to influence the expectations of forum shopping plaintiffs—U.S. district court judges apply foreign law in almost half of all cases. Specifically, they apply foreign law rather than U.S. law at an estimated rate
of 44.5% [36.2, 53.2].122 These decisions are driven primarily by two
factors: the territorial locus of the activity giving rise to the litigation
and the citizenship of the parties.123 Other things being equal, the
greater the extent to which these factors point toward a foreign country, the less likely a U.S. district court judge is to apply U.S. law.124
Contrary to the conventional understanding, the current forum
shopping system does not exhibit strong pro-domestic-law bias. Plaintiffs’ expectations of favorable choice-of-law decisions in U.S. courts
therefore are likely to be lower than they were under the prior system,
thus reducing the incentive to forum shop into U.S. courts to obtain
the advantages of U.S. substantive law.
In summary, the American forum shopping system has evolved.
This subpart has provided an updated understanding of the system’s
key features. After International Shoe, the system’s permissive approach
to personal jurisdiction may have fostered high expectations of
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favorable court access decisions. In the current system, however,
those expectations are offset by aggressive use of the forum non conveniens doctrine to dismiss transnational suits. After the choice-of-law
revolution, the system’s pro-domestic-law bias may have fostered high
expectations of favorable choice-of-law decisions; but at least since the
1990s, there does not appear to be such a bias. As a result, the current
forum shopping system is less likely to encourage transnational forum
shopping into U.S. courts than the system described by the conventional understanding.
B. Transnational Litigation: An Empirical Assessment
The second pillar of the conventional understanding of the
American forum shopping system is that it has contributed to a transnational litigation explosion in the United States. Consistent with the
finding that the forum shopping system has evolved, this subpart argues that transnational forum shopping into U.S. courts might not be
increasing after all. Specifically, this subpart explains that one of the
principal forms of transnational litigation in the United States—alienage litigation—has been decreasing. This subpart begins by defining
alienage litigation and explaining its importance. It then presents empirical evidence of alienage litigation’s decline. By doing so, this subpart challenges the claim that there is a transnational litigation
explosion in U.S. courts.
1. The Importance of Alienage Litigation
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See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (federal-question jurisdiction); id. § 1332 (diversity
jurisdiction).
126
Id. § 1332(a). For alienage jurisdiction purposes, “an alien admitted to the United
States for permanent residence shall be deemed a citizen of the State in which such alien is
domiciled.” Id.
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The two principal types of subject matter jurisdiction in U.S. district courts are federal question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction.125 Alienage jurisdiction is one type of diversity jurisdiction and is
a primary basis for subject matter jurisdiction in transnational litigation. Under § 1332(a) of the United States Code, alienage jurisdiction exists over “all civil actions where the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs,
and is between . . . citizens of a [U.S.] State and citizens or subjects of
a foreign state.”126 I use the term alienage litigation to refer to litigation over which the U.S. district courts have subject matter jurisdiction
on this basis.
Alienage litigation presumably represents the bulk of transnational tort and contract litigation in U.S. district courts because the
other leading basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction in transna-
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tional litigation, federal question jurisdiction, generally is not available for such claims. Tort and contract claims ordinarily arise under
U.S. state law, not U.S. federal law.127
Historically, the central concern motivating alienage jurisdiction
in the federal courts was to avoid “the potentially adverse foreign relations consequences” of having U.S. state courts, with their supposed
antiforeigner bias, adjudicate disputes involving foreign citizens.128
Another motivation was the prospect that by providing a more neutral
federal forum for disputes involving foreign citizens, the United States
could attract more foreign investment.129 Scholars today emphasize
the continued importance of alienage jurisdiction for similar
reasons.130
2. The Decline of Alienage Litigation
If there is a transnational litigation explosion in the United
States, then one would expect alienage litigation to be increasing. To
the contrary, analysis of data collected by the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts (AO) indicates that alienage litigation actually has declined over the last two decades.131
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127
Nevertheless, alienage litigation does not account for all transnational tort and contract claims. Plaintiffs may file such claims in federal courts on the basis of supplemental
jurisdiction if these claims are so closely related to a federal claim that “they form part of
the same case or controversy.” Id. § 1367(a). Moreover, aliens may file civil actions in
federal courts under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) for torts committed in violation of international law. Id. § 1350.
128
See Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical Foundations and Modern
Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction over Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 6
(1996):
By providing for alienage jurisdiction in the national courts, the Framers
acted to avoid the potentially adverse foreign relations consequences
caused by allowing state courts, fueled by a mixture of anti-British and anticreditor sentiment, to resolve disputes involving noncitizens. Instead, the
Framers ensured that foreigners had access to a national court system perceived as less susceptible to the democratic impulse than the state courts.
129
See id. (“Many, particularly the Federalists, hoped that alienage jurisdiction would
attract much needed foreign capital to the fledgling nation.”).
130
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts,
1990 BYU L. REV. 67, 92 (arguing that “cases involving foreign citizens should have a high
priority in the jurisdiction of the federal courts” because of foreign-relations risks raised by
such cases); Johnson, supra note 128, at 48–49 (arguing that “other things being equal,
access to a federal forum should increase the attractiveness of the United States to foreign
business” and that, “[t]o the extent that the United States takes steps to promote the perception that foreign businesses are entitled to procedural fairness in its court systems,
other nations might be expected to reciprocate . . . result[ing] in fairer treatment of this
nation’s businesses by foreign nations”).
131
The AO is the administrative branch of the federal judiciary. For an overview of
the AO data, see INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL RESEARCH, FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE, 1970–2000, CIVIL TERMINATIONS, 1995, at 19–20
(2005) [hereinafter 1995 CODEBOOK], available at http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR08429
(follow “Browse Documentation” hyperlink; after creating or entering username and password, follow “DS98: Civil Terminations, 1995” hyperlink and download codebook). For
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The AO collects data on every case filed in the U.S. district
courts.132 For each statistical year, the Federal Judicial Center (FJC)
consolidates the AO data into two separate data sets: one including all
cases terminated in that year (Civil Terminations) and the other including all cases pending at the end of that year (Civil Pending).133
Both the Civil Terminations data and the Civil Pending data indicate
the filing date and the basis for subject matter jurisdiction for each
case.134 Since 1986, for diversity cases only, the Civil Terminations
data and Civil Pending data also has included a citizenship variable
that indicates whether the plaintiff is a citizen of a U.S. state or of a
foreign country and whether the defendant is a citizen of a U.S. state

information on the Civil Pending data, see INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL
SOCIAL RESEARCH, FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE, 1970–2000, CIVIL
PENDING, 1995 (2005), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR08429 (follow
“Browse Documentation” hyperlink; after creating or entering username and password,
follow “DS99: Civil Pending, 1995” hyperlink and download codebook). As one group of
scholars explain:
[T]he ICPSR [Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research] disseminates a series of data sets gathered and assembled by the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO) and the Federal Judicial
Center (FJC). The data in these sets originate from each of the federal
district courts . . . in the country. For every case that is filed and for every
case that terminates in one of these courts, the court clerk sends the AO a
form containing information about the case. The AO compiles this information each year into two data sets, one for cases terminated during that
year and the other for cases still pending at the end of that year. The AO
then passes these sets on to the FJC for further processing, and the FJC
passes the final product to the ICPSR for dissemination on its Web site.
John R.B. Palmer et al., Why Are So Many People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals
Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 33 (2005) (footnotes omitted). To perform my analysis, I downloaded
the data for the years 1987 through 2008 from the ICPSR website and consolidated them
into a single data set.
132
See INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL RESEARCH, FEDERAL
COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATABASE, 2008, CIVIL TERMINATIONS DATA, 2008, at 5, 15–16
(2010) [hereinafter 2008 CIVIL TERMINATIONS CODEBOOK], available at http://dx.doi.org/
10.3886/ICPSR25002 (follow “Browse Documentation” hyperlink; after creating or entering username and password, download “Codebook” under “DS2: Civil Terminations Data,
2008” folder) (“The Civil Cases Terminations File contains one record for every civil case
terminated in the Federal Court System in 2008.”); Theodore Eisenberg & Margo
Schlanger, The Reliability of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts Database: An Initial Empirical Analysis, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1455, 1462–63 (2003) (“Unlike any other data set
covering the federal courts, [the AO data] purports to cover every case filed. And it seems
more than likely that this is indeed its coverage.”). This distinguishes the AO data from
data available from online databases such as Westlaw and Lexis, which only include decisions that are published in official reporters or otherwise made available by judges for
electronic publication.
133
From 1987 to 1991, the statistical year ends on June 30. For subsequent years, the
statistical year ends on September 30. See 1995 CODEBOOK, supra note 131, at 12.
134
See 2008 CIVIL TERMINATIONS CODEBOOK, supra note 132, at 12 (describing the
JURIS variable).
AND
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or of a foreign country.135 I use this variable to identify alienage
cases.136 In addition, the Civil Terminations data includes the date on
which each case terminated, by judgment or otherwise.
Like any large data set, the AO data is not perfectly reliable.137
However, “both field studies and other data sets confirm the general
picture of district court litigation suggested by the AO data.”138 Moreover, unlike databases such as LexisNexis and Westlaw, the AO data
includes all cases filed in U.S. district courts, not simply those with
published decisions.139 Therefore, the AO data, even if imperfect, appears to be the best available source of data for analysis of general
trends in civil litigation.140
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135
See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia or Xenophobia in U.S.
Courts? Before and After 9/11, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 441, 452 (2007) (noting that
“[s]ince fiscal year 1986, the [data] . . . specifies whether the two principal parties in diversity and alienage cases were American or foreign”). In the AO data set, the citizenship
variable is named residenc. The variable is coded as a two-digit number. The first digit
indicates the citizenship of the principal plaintiff, and the second digit indicates the citizenship of the principal defendant. The following values are used: 1 = Citizen of this State;
2 = Citizen of another State; 3 = Citizen or Subject of a foreign country; 4 = Incorporated
or principal place of business in this State; 5 = Incorporated or principal place of business
in another State; and 6 = Foreign Nation. 2008 CIVIL TERMINATIONS CODEBOOK, supra note
132, at 15–16.
136
I counted a case as an alienage case only if the plaintiff was a citizen of a U.S. state
and the defendant was a foreign citizen or if the plaintiff was a foreign citizen and the
defendant was a citizen of a U.S. state. Thus, I counted a case as an alienage case only if
the citizenship variable equals 13, 23, 43, 53, 31, 32, 34, or 35. I did not count a case as an
alienage case if a foreign nation was a party or if the plaintiff and the defendant were both
foreign citizens because these party configurations are not included in alienage litigation.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (2006) (covering only controversies between “citizens of a
[U.S.] State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state”); cf. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra
note 135, at 452 n.39 (taking the same approach). This means that my count of alienage
cases does not include suits under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3) (suits between “citizens of different [U.S.] States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties”)
or suits under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4) (suits between “a foreign state . . . as plaintiff and
citizens of a [U.S.] State or of different [U.S.] States”). See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3), (a)(4).
137
See Eisenberg & Schlanger, supra note 132, at 1458 (“Like many large data sets, the
AO data are not completely accurate.” (footnote omitted)). For example, when new coding procedures are introduced, complete and proper implementation of those procedures
might not be immediate. I am not aware of any implementation problems regarding the
foreign-citizen coding introduced in fiscal year 1986. Out of an abundance of caution,
however, my analysis begins with 1987 to account for the possibility of an implementation
lag. Insofar as such a lag may have persisted into 1987 or even 1988, data for those years
may not be as reliable as for subsequent years.
138
Id. at 1464. However, there is evidence suggesting reliability problems with the
AO’s bankruptcy-court data, as well as with the AO data on class actions, patent cases, and
amounts awarded following trials. Id. at 1464 & n.46. My analysis does not use these types
of data.
139
See id. at 1462–63 (“[O]ne strength of the AO data set is its completeness. Unlike
any other data set covering the federal courts, it purports to cover every case filed. And it
seems more than likely that this is indeed its coverage. Cases get entered into the database
on filing, and there is a built-in check because they get entered again, on termination.”).
140
See id. at 1463–64 (“[F]or researchers seeking to identify all federal district court
cases in a certain subject matter category, it is clear that the AO database is the easiest, and
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perhaps the most reliable, method of doing so, provided that the subject matter of interest
matches one or a group of the AO case categories.”).
141
The annual filings figures are extracted from the Civil Terminations data sets. As
explained below, they likely underestimate the total number of cases filed each year, especially in the most recent years. See infra notes 146–47 and accompanying text. Therefore,
the raw estimates should be treated with caution.
142
See Paul Krugman, Once and Again, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2000, at WK9 (“Whatever else
they may have been, the 90’s were the decade of globalization.”); Barry Eichengreen, One
Economy, Ready or Not: Thomas Friedman’s Jaunt Through Globalization, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(May–June 1999) (suggesting that it is now “obvious that historians will look back on the
1990s as the decade of globalization”).
143
My analysis of the AO’s nature-of-suit codes indicates that this uptick consisted
principally of a cluster of asbestos product-liability claims filed by foreign plaintiffs in 2000.
144
The spike appears to reflect an increase in asbestos product-liability claims. See
supra note 143.

29417_crn_96-3 Sheet No. 41 Side B

My analysis of the AO data indicates that alienage filings, pending
alienage cases, and alienage terminations all have been declining.
First, as Figure 1 shows, the estimated number of alienage filings declined dramatically in the late 1980s (from 9,276 in 1987 to 4,806 in
1989).141 The decline continued at a more modest rate through the
1990s—the “decade of globalization” (from 3,618 in 1990 to 2,610 in
1999).142 After a one-year uptick to an estimated 3,131 alienage filings in 2000,143 the decline continued into the 2000s (from 2,342 in
2001 to 1,637 in 2005).
As Figure 2 shows, both U.S.–plaintiff and foreign-plaintiff alienage filings have exhibited this same general downward trend. Between 1987 and 1989, U.S.–plaintiff alienage filings fell from
approximately 5,693 to 3,226, and foreign-plaintiff alienage filings fell
from approximately 3,583 to 1,580. Between 1990 and 1999,
U.S.–plaintiff alienage filings fell from approximately 2,296 to 1,433,
and foreign-plaintiff alienage filings fell from approximately 1,322 to
1,177 (although with significant fluctuation). Between 2000 and
2005, U.S.–plaintiff alienage filings fell from approximately 1,142 to
744, and foreign-plaintiff alienage filings, after a spike to 1,989 in
2000, fell to approximately 893 in 2005.144 Until the late 1990s, the
number of U.S.–plaintiff alienage filings exceeded the number of foreign-plaintiff alienage filings, but more recently, the annual number
of foreign-plaintiff filings has been slightly higher.
Might the decline in alienage filings merely reflect a broader decline in litigation in U.S. district courts? Figure 3 suggests that this is
not the case. There are signs of a decline in total litigation, federal
question, and domestic-diversity filing rates in 2005, but the general
trend in both total and federal question filings is upward, and domestic-diversity filing rates have held roughly steady. Compared to other
types of litigation, then, the decline in alienage litigation is unusual.
Figure 3 also indicates that alienage litigation constitutes a very
small portion of the total civil workload of the U.S. district courts—so
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FIGURE 1
FILINGS (1987–2005)
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Barcus, supra note 83, at 658.
See supra text accompanying note 127 (linking alienage litigation to transnational
tort and contract claims).
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small a portion that the trends over time in alienage filings are barely
discernible in the figure. As Table 3 shows, in the decade ending in
2005, alienage filings represented an estimated 0.97% of total civil actions filed in U.S. district courts. This percentage has declined from
an estimated 1.26% in 1996 to 0.71% in 2005. Alienage suits by foreign plaintiffs against U.S. defendants—the focus of some observers
concerned about the supposed rise of transnational suits—constitute
only about one half of one percent of all civil actions filed in the U.S.
district courts. Contrary to some claims, these results suggest that
there is not a “tidal wave of foreign plaintiffs clogging up the dockets
in our courts”145—and if there is such a wave, it does not consist of
alienage filings and thus most likely does not consist of tort or contract claims either.146
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TABLE 3
FILINGS (1996–2005)

Domestic
Foreign
Alienage
Domestic
Plaintiff
Foreign
Plaintiff
Alienage (% of Total) Plaintiff (% of Total) Plaintiff (% of Total)

Total

1996

261,270

3,293

1.26%

1,909

0.73%

1,384

0.53%

1997

273,773

3,051

1.11%

1,697

0.62%

1,354

0.49%

1998

251,684

2,645

1.05%

1,387

0.55%

1,258

0.50%

1999

258,429

2,610

1.01%

1,433

0.55%

1,177

0.46%

2000

253,698

3,131

1.23%

1,142

0.45%

1,989

0.78%

2001

263,737

2,342

0.89%

1,096

0.42%

1,246

0.47%

2002

252,445

2,308

0.91%

984

0.39%

1,324

0.52%

2003

254,578

2,167

0.85%

925

0.36%

1,242

0.49%

2004

270,178

1,818

0.67%

848

0.31%

970

0.36%

2005

230,282

1,637

0.71%

744

0.32%

893

0.39%

Average 257,007

2,500

0.97%

1,217

0.47%

1,284

0.50%

Alienage filings are a more direct measure of transnational forum
shopping into U.S. courts than are pending alienage cases or alienage
terminations. However, this measure has a significant disadvantage.
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Notes: This table presents estimates of the annual number of civil cases, alienage cases, “domestic plaintiff versus foreign defendant” alienage cases, and “foreign plaintiff versus domestic
defendant” alienage cases filed each year from 1996 to 2005. The annual filing rates are extracted from the Civil Terminations datasets.
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FIGURE 3
COMPARED TO OTHER FILINGS (1987–2005)
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147
For example, cases filed in 2004 or in 2005 that were still pending in 2005 would
not be counted in the Civil Terminations data sets as of 2005.
148
The earlier the year, the less significant the lag, and the more accurate the estimate. For example, my analysis indicates that the filing figures extracted from the Civil
Terminations data sets underestimate actual filings by approximately 6.2% in 2005, 2.4%
in 2004, and between 0.5% and 1.6% in earlier years. Assuming that the extent of lag on
average is the same for alienage cases and civil cases in general, the lag should not affect
the percentage calculations in Table 3. Because my analysis indicates that by 2006 the Civil
Terminations data sets substantially underestimate actual filings (by more than 15.6% for
2006), I do not report filings data based on the 2006, 2007, or 2008 Civil Terminations data
sets.
149
I extracted the pending-cases figures from the Civil Pending data sets, which are
available for statistical years 1987–89, 1991, 1994–95, 1997, and 2000–2007, and calendar
year 2008.
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The annual filings figures used for Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3, and
Table 3 are extracted from the Civil Terminations data sets. The record for a case does not appear in those data sets until the case has
terminated.147 As a result of this lag, the Civil Terminations data may
understate the annual number of alienage cases filed, particularly in
recent years, and the estimates of raw alienage filing numbers should
be treated with caution.148
Therefore, I analyzed a second alienage litigation trend that is
not subject to this lag: the annual number of pending alienage
cases.149 The results, presented in Figure 4, confirm the downward
trend in alienage litigation: the number of pending alienage cases in
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the U.S. district courts declined from 26,506 in 1987, to 3,287 in 2000,
to 2,029 in 2008. Moreover, as Table 4 confirms, alienage litigation
constitutes only a small fraction of the civil caseload of the U.S. district
courts.

Number of Cases Pending
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260
19 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
8
19 7
8
19 8
8
19 9
9
19 0
9
19 1
9
19 2
9
19 3
9
19 4
9
19 5
9
19 6
9
19 7
9
19 8
9
20 9
0
20 0
0
20 1
0
20 2
0
20 3
0
20 4
0
20 5
0
20 6
0
20 7
08

FIGURE 4
ALIENAGE CASES PENDING (1987–2008)
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150
See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 462 tbl.4 (noting that “alienage terminations plummeted” between 1986 and 2005). Clermont and Eisenberg also discovered a
decline in the number of alienage judgments. See id. at 461 tbl.3 (noting the “dramatically
decreasing number of . . . alienage judgments over the last two decades”).
151
Id. at 462 tbl.4. My own analysis of the most recent version of the Civil Terminations data indicates that a more accurate estimate of alienage terminations in 2005 is 1,868
and that the number of alienage terminations in 2006 and 2007 was approximately 1,929
and 1,978, respectively.
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Finally, in an earlier study using the AO Civil Terminations data,
Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg were the first to discover a
“plummeting” number of alienage cases terminating—by settlement,
judgment, or otherwise—in the U.S. district courts each year.150 Specifically, Clermont and Eisenberg found that the number of alienage
terminations declined from 24,202 in 1986 to 8,092 in 1989; from
6,374 in 1990 to 2,725 in 1999; and from 3,230 in 2000 to 1,976 in
2005.151 This finding is further evidence that, contrary to claims of a
transnational litigation explosion, alienage litigation has been on the
decline.
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TABLE 4
CASES PENDING (2000–2008)

Domestic
Foreign
Alienage
Domestic
Plaintiff
Foreign
Plaintiff
Alienage (% of Total) Plaintiff (% of Total) Plaintiff (% of Total)

Year

Total

2000

249,261

3,287

1.32%

1,697

0.68%

1,590

0.64%

2001

252,935

2,619

1.04%

1,339

0.53%

1,280

0.51%

2002

265,926

2,439

0.92%

1,161

0.44%

1,278

0.48%

2003

261,065

2,466

0.94%

1,119

0.43%

1,347

0.52%

2004

267,270

2,245

0.84%

993

0.37%

1,252

0.47%

2005

266,216

2,125

0.80%

948

0.36%

1,177

0.44%

2006

251,832

2,144

0.85%

973

0.39%

1,171

0.46%

2007

265,082

1,997

0.75%

903

0.34%

1,094

0.41%

2008

304,869

2,029

0.67%

864

0.28%

1,165

0.38%

Average 264,940

2,372

0.90%

1,111

0.42%

1,262

0.48%

Notes: This table presents the number of total civil cases, alienage cases, “domestic plaintiff
versus foreign defendant” alienage cases, and “foreign plaintiff versus domestic defendant”
alienage cases pending as of September 30, 2000 through September 30, 2007 and December
31, 2008. The pending cases figures are extracted from the Civil Pending datasets.

What about other types of transnational litigation in U.S. courts?
Unfortunately, the AO data does not separately identify transnational
litigation over which the U.S. district courts have subject matter jurisdiction on grounds other than alienage.152 For example, it does not
identify diversity cases between citizens of different U.S. states arising
out of activity with connections to one or more foreign countries;
cases involving foreign citizens as additional parties;153 or transnational suits over which there is federal question,154 admiralty,155 or
bankruptcy jurisdiction,156 or jurisdiction based on the Alien Tort
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152
See id. at 461 n.50 (noting that AO “has chosen to code foreign citizenship only for
[alienage cases]”); see also Dubinsky, supra note 81, at 366 n.10 (“Surprisingly, little has
been done by the Federal Judicial Center, the National Center for State Courts, or the
Judicial Conference of the United States to provide Congress or the public with hard data
on the number and kind of suits in the system with a transnational component . . . .”).
153
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2006) (domestic diversity jurisdiction); id. § 1332(a)(3)
(domestic diversity jurisdiction with foreign citizens as additional parties).
154
Id. § 1331. Thus, the alienage data probably does not include most transnational
regulatory litigation in U.S. courts. See generally Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 251 (2006) (providing seminal analysis of transnational
regulatory litigation).
155
28 U.S.C. § 1333.
156
Id. § 1334.
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Statute157 or the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.158 Moreover, because the AO data includes only filings in U.S. federal courts, it cannot capture transnational litigation in U.S. state courts. Although the
AO data therefore leaves open the possibility that the decline in alienage filings extends to other types of transnational litigation in U.S.
courts,159 it also leaves open the possibility that one or more of these
other types of transnational litigation may be increasing even as alienage litigation is decreasing. Without more comprehensive data, inferences about broader trends in transnational litigation in U.S. courts
must remain uncertain.160 Nevertheless, my findings challenge the
widely held assumption that transnational forum shopping into U.S.
courts is on the rise.

A CLOSER LOOK

AT THE

IV
SYSTEM: FORUM NON CONVENIENS
IN ACTION

As argued in Part III, the forum non conveniens doctrine plays a
central role in the current forum shopping system. In general, aggressive use of the doctrine to dismiss transnational litigation should reduce expectations of favorable court access decisions, thus reducing
the incentives to file transnational lawsuits in U.S. courts.161 However,
we know very little about how judges actually make forum non conveniens decisions. In particular, we know very little about whether the
doctrine, as applied, is a well-tailored anti–forum shopping device that
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157
See id. § 1350 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.”). Although lawsuits brought under the ATS have attracted considerable
attention and appear to have increased since the 1980s, existing studies suggest that they
remain relatively uncommon. See, e.g., Jeffrey Davis, Justice Without Borders: Human Rights
Cases in U.S. Courts, 28 LAW & POL’Y 60, 73–74 (2006) (finding that federal courts of appeals decided fourteen ATS cases between 2000 and 2004 but decided only thirty-one cases
between 1976 and 1999 and that federal district courts have decided thirty-six ATS cases
between 2000 and 2004 but only forty before then); Beth Stephens, Judicial Deference and the
Unreasonable Views of the Bush Administration, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 773, 810–11 (2008) (noting that since 1980, approximately 185 cases have been litigated under the ATS, about 105
of which have been filed since 2004, and about 123 of which were dismissed).
158
See 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (jurisdiction over civil suits against foreign sovereigns if there
is no sovereign immunity). Nor does the AO data identify cases over which jurisdiction
exists because the dispute is between a foreign state as a plaintiff and a citizen of a U.S.
state, id. § 1332(a)(4), or where the suit is against a foreign consul or diplomat, id. § 1351.
159
Cf. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 461 n.50 (noting that the “drop in
terminations involving foreign litigants could extend well beyond alienage cases” and that
AO data may therefore “be hiding a drop in foreigners litigating on other jurisdictional
bases”).
160
Christopher A. Whytock, Litigation, Arbitration, and the Transnational Shadow of the
Law, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 449, 461 (2008) (“For now, it is difficult to do more than
speculate about whether transnational litigation in general is characterized by the same
trends that characterize alienage cases in the U.S. federal district courts.”).
161
See supra Part III.A.1.
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focuses on discouraging suits that would more appropriately be resolved in a foreign court, as judicial statements of the doctrine suggest;162 or whether it is instead incoherent, unpredictable, or driven
by judges’ individual preferences, as the doctrine’s critics suggest.163
In this Part, I address this gap in our understanding and attempt to
shed further light on the operation of the current forum shopping
system by presenting a systematic empirical analysis of forum non conveniens in action.164
A. Potential Determinants of Forum Non Conveniens Decisions
My analysis focuses on two questions. First, to what extent does
the forum non conveniens doctrine, as actually applied by judges, further the doctrine’s stated goals? According to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s most recent discussion of the doctrine, dismissal on forum
non conveniens grounds is for cases in which “the court abroad is the
more appropriate and convenient forum for adjudicating the controversy.”165 It is widely accepted that the appropriateness of a forum
depends largely on the extent of the forum’s connections to the dispute.166 Ordinarily, the most important connections are thought to
be the citizenship of the parties to the dispute and the territorial locus
of the events giving rise to the dispute—particularly the place of conduct and the place of injury.167 The private interest and public inter-
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162
See, e.g., Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007)
(noting that dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds is for cases in which a “court
abroad is the more appropriate and convenient forum for adjudicating the controversy”).
163
See, e.g., Lear, supra note 112, at 602–03 (“Federal forum non conveniens decisions
appear to depend more on the individual biases of district court judges than any identifiable legal standard.”); Stein, supra note 27, at 785 (describing “crazy quilt of ad hoc, capricious, and inconsistent [forum non conveniens] decisions”).
164
See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 15 (1910)
(distinguishing between “law in the books” and “law in action”). For an empirical analysis
of judicial application of the doctrine’s adequate alternative-forum requirement, see Lii,
supra note 115.
165
See, e.g., Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 425.
166
See, e.g., BELL, supra note 5, at 337 (arguing that appropriate forum is “that forum
with which the dispute has the closest and most real connection”); ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET
AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 152–53 (Michie Co. 4th ed. 1986) (discussing that under
forum non conveniens doctrine, courts “refuse to hear actions in which the cause of action
sued on . . . has little or no connection with the state in which suit is brought and can more
fairly be tried elsewhere”); Bassett, supra note 25, at 379–80 (describing the most convenient forum as the forum with the “most obvious connection to the litigation”); Stewart E.
Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 1013–14 (1994)
(describing an inappropriate forum as a “forum with little or no connection to the dispute
at hand”); Bies, supra note 76, at 517 (arguing that forum choice is legitimate when there is
“some clear connection of the cause of action to the forum”).
167
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84 cmt. f (1971) (stating that in
the “great majority” of cases, three forums will be “appropriate”: the state where occurrence took place; the state of the defendant’s domicile; or the state of the plaintiff’s domicile); Silberman, supra note 16, at 527 (referring to “the more relevant jurisdiction” as “the
place of residence, injury, or sale”); Silberman, supra note 55, at 336 (referring to “most
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est factors that the Supreme Court enumerated to evaluate the
convenience of a forum are themselves closely related to these types of
connections.168
But to what extent do these connections influence judges’ actual
forum non conveniens decisions? In other words, how effectively does
the doctrine, as applied, distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate transnational forum shopping into U.S. courts? If judges
are effectively making this distinction, then, other things being equal,
the probability of a forum non conveniens dismissal should be higher
when the parties are foreign and when the territorial locus of the activity giving rise to the dispute is foreign. To estimate these influences, I created four variables and coded them for each case in my
forum non conveniens data set as follows: Foreign Plaintiffs (1 if the
plaintiffs are all foreign, 0 otherwise); Foreign Defendants (1 if the defendants are all foreign, 0 otherwise); Foreign Conduct (1 if the conduct
giving rise to the dispute occurred entirely outside U.S. territory, 0
otherwise); and Foreign Injury (1 if the injury giving rise to the dispute
occurred entirely outside U.S. territory, 0 otherwise).169 These variables and the other variables in my analysis are summarized below in
Table 5.
However, scholars have suggested at least three factors unrelated
to the appropriateness of a plaintiff’s choice of a U.S. court that may
nevertheless influence forum non conveniens decision making:
caseload, foreign country regime type, and judges’ ideological attitudes. Regarding caseload, one of the forum non conveniens doc-
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egregious” cases of transnational forum shopping as those in which “neither party to the
dispute is a resident of the United States and the dispute is centered abroad”).
168
See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947). For example, ease of
access to proof and witnesses—which is among the doctrine’s private interest factors—
depends on the location of the parties and other relevant sources of evidence, which in
turn will often overlap with the parties’ countries of citizenship and with the place of the
activity giving rise to the litigation. In addition, one of the public interest factors is
whether the underlying dispute is a “localized controvers[y].” See id. at 509. The Court
does not define the meaning of the phrase, but the phrase implies that one of the parties
or some part of the underlying activity is local.
169
I coded these variables based on the published opinions in the data set. This “connecting factor” approach is widely accepted as a method of gauging appropriateness. See
supra notes 165–67 and accompanying text. However, it is not necessarily the best or only
possible approach. Indeed, in one of its seminal forum non conveniens decisions, the U.S.
Supreme Court avoided specifying particular connecting factors, explaining that it was
“[w]ise[ ]” to avoid any attempt “to catalogue the circumstances which will justify or require either grant or denial” of motions to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds and
preferring case-by-case analysis based on the court’s discretion. Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508.
The Court instead articulated the private interest and public interest factors discussed
above. Id. at 508–09. As a practical matter of empirical methodology, it would be difficult
to measure these factors and test their distinct influences on forum non conveniens decision making. However, the citizenship and territoriality variables used in my analysis, being correlated with those factors, should be reasonable proxies.
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trine’s public interest factors is “administrative difficulties flowing
from court congestion.”170 Some critics argue that this factor has led
judges to use the doctrine as a caseload-management tool. As one of
the doctrine’s critics argues, “The American courts’ overt reliance on
calendar congestion as a standard reason for dismissing cases tips the
scales far too heavily against retaining jurisdiction.”171 One would expect the busiest judges to feel the greatest pressure to use the forum
non conveniens doctrine in this manner. Thus, if judges are in fact
using the forum non conveniens doctrine to reduce their caseloads,
then, other things being equal, the larger the judge’s caseload, the
higher the probability that the judge will dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. To estimate this influence, I created the variable
Caseload using the Federal Court Management Statistics maintained by
the AO.172
Liberal international law theory suggests another factor that may
influence forum non conveniens decision making: whether the foreign country in which the proposed alternative forum is located is a
liberal democracy. According to this theory, the “courts of liberal
[countries] handle cases involving other liberal [countries] differently
from the way they handle cases involving nonliberal [countries].”173
In particular, within the community of liberal countries, courts see
themselves as “cooperating in an effort to direct the [transnational]
litigation to the natural or most appropriate forum.”174 Critics of liberal international law theory reject the claim that U.S. courts relate
differently to liberal democracies than to other countries.175 But if
the theory is correct, then, other things being equal, U.S. judges
170
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Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981).
Robertson, supra note 89, at 417; see also Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 750 n.10 (1982) (“[T]he explosion of litigation has created a
strong incentive for district courts to [use the forum non conveniens doctrine] to shunt
burdensome business elsewhere.”).
172
Federal Court Management Statistics 2008: U.S. District Court—Judicial Caseload Profile,
U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/cgi-bin/cmsd2008.pl (last visited
Nov. 9, 2010) (select “All District Courts” from drop-down menu, then follow “Generate”
hyperlink). I used the “weighted filings” per judgeship figure. I used a one-year lag because, due to the typical duration of cases, the prior year’s filings are likely to be a more
accurate measure of the district’s current workload.
173
Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of
State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907, 1917 (1992). Anne-Marie Burley (later Anne-Marie
Slaughter Burley and now Anne-Marie Slaughter) specifically claims that the theory applies
to forum non conveniens decision making. Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law
and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 205, 232 (1993).
174
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L.
REV. 99, 105 (1994); see also id. at 131 (arguing that this tendency is “likely to be stronger
among the courts of liberal democracies”).
175
See generally José E. Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter’s
Liberal Theory, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 183, 217 (2001) (arguing that regime type does not determine interactions by U.S. courts with other courts).
171
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should be more likely to dismiss cases in favor of the courts of other
liberal democracies than in favor of courts outside the community of
liberal countries. To estimate this influence, I created the variable
Liberal Democracy based on the annual Freedom House Freedom in the
World survey.176 I coded the variable as 1 (yes) if the proposed alternative forum is in a country rated “free” in the survey for the year prior
to the court’s decision; otherwise, I coded it as 0 (no).177
Finally, some scholars argue that “[f]ederal forum non conveniens decisions appear to depend more on the individual biases of
district court judges than any identifiable legal standard.”178 The predominant political science theory of judicial decision making—the attitudinal model—provides support for this claim. According to the
attitudinal model, the most important factor influencing a judge’s decision is the judge’s conservative or liberal ideological attitude.179
The attitudinal model thus implies that the probability that a judge
will dismiss a case on forum non conveniens grounds depends at least
partly on whether the judge is conservative or liberal. As George
Brown has argued, conservative judges should have a particularly
strong aversion to forum shopping.180 If this is correct, then, other
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176
The Freedom in the World survey is a leading annual survey on national levels of
democracy. For information about the survey, see Freedom in the World, FREEDOM HOUSE,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15 (last visited Nov. 9, 2010).
177
Although these ratings generally are stable over the time period covered by my data
set, I use a one-year lag based on the theory that a judge is unlikely to become immediately
aware of changes in a foreign country’s politics. For purposes of liberal international-law
theory, Slaughter defines “liberal” states as those “with juridical equality, constitutional
protections of individual rights, representative republican governments, and market economies based on private property rights.” Burley, supra note 173, at 1909. The Freedom
House rankings capture these characteristics by explicitly accounting for equal treatment
under the law, protection of individual rights (including freedoms of assembly, open public discussion, and defendants’ rights), representative government (including election of
representatives through free and fair elections and other political rights), and privateproperty rights. See Methodology, FREEDOM HOUSE, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=363&year=2010 (last visited Nov. 9, 2010). The other leading measure, the POLITY IV PROJECT, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
(last visited Nov. 9, 2010), captures the concept of representative government well, but it
only indirectly captures the other elements of Burley’s definition. Therefore, for testing
Slaughter’s liberal theory of international law, the Freedom House measure appears more
appropriate.
178
Lear, supra note 112, at 602–03.
179
According to two of the theory’s leading proponents, “[t]his model holds that the
Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological
attitudes and values of the justices.” JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86 (2002). As Segal and Spaeth put it,
“Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is extremely conservative; Marshall voted the
way he did because he was extremely liberal.” Id.
180
See George D. Brown, The Ideologies of Forum Shopping—Why Doesn’t a Conservative
Court Protect Defendants?, 71 N.C. L. REV. 649, 651 (1993). Brown argues that “[a]nything
other than a broad condemnation” of forum shopping from conservative judges would be
surprising because
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things being equal, conservative judges should be more likely than
liberal judges to dismiss transnational litigation on forum non conveniens grounds. To estimate the influence of judges’ ideological attitudes, I created the variable Judge Nominated by Republican and coded it
as 1 (yes) if a Republican president nominated the deciding judge,
and 0 (no) otherwise.181
My analysis also asks a second question about forum non conveniens in action: To what extent are judges’ forum non conveniens
decisions predictable? According to some of the doctrine’s critics,
these decisions are very unpredictable.182 If that is correct, then the
forum non conveniens doctrine would generate considerable forum
non conveniens litigation, but it would not be an effective anti–forum
shopping instrument.183 So far, however, scholars have not attempted
to estimate the extent to which forum non conveniens decision mak-
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[f]orum-shopping threatens such conservative values as the desire to avoid
the proliferation of lawsuits, a distrust of manipulation of the system to
achieve substantive ends (at least by plaintiffs), and a general pro-defendant tilt. The principal victims of state-state forum-shopping are interstate
corporate entities, an interest group that [conservative judges] might be
expected to favor.
Id. (footnote omitted).
181
This is a common measure of judges’ ideological attitudes. See Tracey E. George &
Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323, 328
(1992) (using the party of the nominating president as a proxy for ideological attitudes);
see also Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1650–55 (1998) (defending this approach and introducing
alternatives). However, tests using the party of the nominating president as a proxy for a
judge’s ideological attitudes may underestimate the impact of those attitudes. See Joshua B.
Fischman & David S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideology, and How Should We Measure It?, 29 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 133, 170–71 (2009). Therefore, such tests are “best interpreted as providing only a lower bound on ideology.” Id. at 171. I obtained the data on nominating presidents from the Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, http://
www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2010).
182
See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 516 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting):
The broad and indefinite discretion left [by the forum non conveniens doctrine] to federal courts to decide the question of convenience from the
welter of factors which are relevant to such a judgment, will inevitably produce a complex of close and indistinguishable decisions from which accurate prediction of the proper forum will become difficult, if not impossible.
See also Robertson & Speck, supra note 111, at 971, 975 (arguing that the forum non conveniens doctrine “is vague and amorphous, yielding little predictability and virtually guaranteeing against clear explanation of the outcomes achieved under it”); Stein, supra note
27, at 785 (describing “crazy quilt of ad hoc, capricious, and inconsistent [forum non conveniens] decisions”).
183
See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 455 (1994) (arguing that because of
its unpredictability, “forum non conveniens cannot really be relied upon . . . in deciding . . . where to sue”); Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 516 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that due to
its unpredictability, the forum non conveniens doctrine will “clutter the very threshold of
the federal courts with a preliminary trial of fact concerning the relative convenience of
forums”); VON MEHREN, supra note 19, at 324 (noting criticism that “the doctrine compromises legal security and predictability and breeds litigation”).
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TABLE 5
VARIABLES: FACTORS POTENTIALLY INFLUENCING FORUM
NON CONVENIENS DECISIONS

Variable

Coding

Source

Foreign Plaintiffs

1 (yes) if plaintiffs all foreign, 0 (no)
otherwise.

Court’s published opinion.

Foreign Defendants

1 (yes) if defendants all foreign, 0 (no)
otherwise.

Court’s published opinion.

Foreign Conduct

1 (yes) if conduct giving rise to dispute
occurred entirely outside U.S. territory,
0 (no) otherwise.

Court’s published opinion.

Foreign Injury

1 (yes) if injury giving rise to dispute
occurred entirely outside U.S. territory,
0 (no) otherwise.

Court’s published opinion.

Caseload

Log of caseload of judicial district in
year prior to decision.

Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts, Federal Court
Management Statistics.

Liberal Democracy

1 (yes) if foreign state rated “free” by
Freedom House, 0 (no) if rated “partly
free” or “not free,” in year before
decision.

Freedom House, Freedom in
the World Survey.

Judge Nominated by
Republican

1 (yes) if judge nominated by
Republican president, 0 (no)
otherwise.

Federal Judicial Center,
Biographical Directory of
Federal Judges.

ing is unpredictable. I will attempt to do so using a number of standard statistical measures.
B. Empirical Findings
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184
Here, the dependent variable is Decision, which either has the value of Yes (1) for
decisions to grant a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds or No (0) for
decisions to deny such motions. For further information on logit analysis, see generally
DAVID W. HOSMER & STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION (2d ed. 2000). I
used the Clarify software program in Stata to simulate a change in the expected value of
the dependent variable caused by increasing each dichotomous explanatory variable from
0 to 1 (and Caseload, a continuous variable, from its 25th to 75th percentile), setting each
of the other variables at its mode (for dichotomous variables) or mean (for Caseload).
MICHAEL TOMZ ET AL., CLARIFY: SOFTWARE FOR INTERPRETING AND PRESENTING STATISTICAL
RESULTS (2001).
185
As noted above, my sample consists only of published decisions and therefore
might not be representative of unpublished decisions. However, because I am interested
in the impact of domestic court decisions on plaintiffs’ decisions to forum shop into U.S.
courts, published decisions are the most relevant. See supra Part I. Moreover, any unrepresentativeness that may result from relying only on published decisions does not create

29417_crn_96-3 Sheet No. 47 Side B

To estimate the effects of these factors on the probability that a
judge will grant a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens
grounds, I used logit analysis—a standard statistical method for estimating the effects that hypothesized explanatory variables have on dependent variables with only two possible values.184 The results are
presented below in Table 6.185 As the table indicates, I estimated
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these effects using two different models. Model 1 includes all explanatory variables except the Judge Nominated by Republican variable. By
excluding this variable, I am able to estimate Model 1 in three different ways: with all judges included; with only judges nominated by
Democrats; and with only judges nominated by Republicans. This in
turn allows me to estimate whether the factors influencing the forum
non conveniens decisions of conservative judges differ from the factors influencing the forum non conveniens decisions of liberal judges.
To estimate whether judges’ ideological attitudes influence the
probability of a forum non conveniens dismissal, the Judge Nominated
by Republican variable is included in Model 2.
Are forum non conveniens decisions based on factors of citizenship and territoriality—factors that are widely understood as distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate transnational forum
shopping into U.S. courts? The results suggest that such factors do
have a considerable influence on judges’ forum non conveniens decisions. In both Model 1 (with all judges included) and Model 2, the
impact of one of the citizenship variables (Foreign Plaintiffs) and both
of the territoriality variables (Foreign Conduct and Foreign Injury) are
statistically significant and, as expected, have a positive effect on the
probability of dismissal. For example, in Model 1, the probability of
dismissal is an estimated 24.1% [6.5, 42.2] higher when the plaintiffs
are all foreign, 18.8% [1.6, 36.7] higher when the conduct occurred
outside U.S. territory, and 30.5% [11.0, 49.1] higher when the injury
occurred outside U.S. territory. As Model 2 shows, these effects remain even after controlling for the judge’s ideological attitudes.186
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sample-selection bias in causal inferences unless two conditions are met: (1) a criterion
used to select the sample upon which the inferences are based (e.g., whether a decision
was published) is a cause of the dependent variable (i.e., whether the judge granted a
motion to dismiss) and (2) that criterion is correlated with an explanatory variable of interest (e.g., the place of conduct). My analysis suggests that there is not a substantial risk that
these conditions are met, with the possible exception of Caseload. See Christopher Alexander Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance: The Politics of Private International Law 147–48 (2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University) (on file with
Duke University Library) (discussing potential determinants of publication and concluding
that most possible determinants of publication are unlikely to have a causal effect on forum non conveniens decision making and that there are not obvious reasons to expect
them to be correlated with my explanatory variables).
186
Specifically, with the Judge Nominated by Republican variable included, the probability
of dismissal is an estimated 26.5% [7.9, 45.1] higher when the plaintiffs are all foreign,
20.3% [1.9, 38.6] higher when the conduct occurred outside U.S. territory, and 27.5%
[8.4, 47.8] when the injury occurred outside U.S. territory. The impact of the Foreign Defendants variable is not statistically significant at traditionally accepted levels. See generally
HOSMER & LEMESHOW, supra note 184, at 36–43 (discussing methods for testing statistical
significance of models and estimating confidence intervals, using a 95% confidence interval as a baseline).
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TABLE 6
EFFECTS ON PROBABILITY OF FORUM NON
CONVENIENS DISMISSAL
Estimated Effects on Probability of Forum Non
Conveniens Dismissal
Model 1

Model 2

All

Dem.

Rep.

24.1%***
[6.5, 42.2]

17.3%
[−5.6, 48.8]

32.6%**
[8.2, 57.0]

26.5%***
[7.9, 45.1]

9.7%
[−10.8, 28.0]

−0.01%
[−25.9, 22.4]

13.6%
[−10.8, 40.3]

8.4%
[−9.9, 27.0]

Foreign Conduct

18.8%**
[1.6, 36.7]

8.2%
[−11.7, 35.4]

31.0%**
[4.6, 56.2]

20.3%**
[1.9, 38.6]

Foreign Injury

30.5%***
[11.0, 49.1]

40.7%***
[8.2, 66.4]

17.1%
[−5.0, 43.1]

27.5%***
[8.4, 47.8]

Caseload

−1.4%
[−10.9, 7.8]

−8.2%
[−23.7, 2.5]

4.6%
[−7.4, 16.9]

−2.2%
[−11.4, 7.7]

Liberal Democracy

26.6%***
[8.1, 44.0]

25.5%*
[−2.5, 53.7]

28.5%***
[9.4, 49.7]

25.4%***
[8.3, 40.9]

Foreign Plaintiffs
Foreign Defendants

−11.7%
[−27.4, 4.6]

Judge Nominated by
Republican
Number of
Observations

196

89

105

194

Prob > Chi2

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Correctly Classified

70.9%

76.4%

71.4%

71.1%

Adjusted Count RSquared

.394

.500

.348

.398

Area Under ROC
Curve

.788

.827

.785

.793

Controlling for other factors, the defendant’s nationality does not significantly affect the probability of dismissal.187
The Caseload variable does not have a significant impact on
judges’ forum non conveniens decisions. Of course, this finding does
not disprove the claim that judges improperly use the forum non conveniens doctrine to limit their caseloads. However, it would seem to
alleviate this concern.
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No models showed 95% confidence that the effect of the Foreign Defendants variable
is either positive or negative.
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Notes: This table presents estimates of the effects of the listed explanatory variables
on the probability that a U.S. district court judge will grant a motion to dismiss a
transnational lawsuit based on the forum non conveniens doctrine. The 95% confidence interval for each estimate is provided in brackets. Standard indicators of
statistical significance are also provided (*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01).
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The Liberal Democracy variable has a strong positive effect: the
probability of dismissal is an estimated 26.6% [8.1, 44.0] higher in
Model 1 (with all judges included) and 25.4% [8.3, 40.9] higher in
Model 2 when the alternative foreign court is in a liberal democracy
than when it is not.188 This result provides support for the liberal international law theory hypothesis that U.S. judges are more likely to
dismiss cases in favor of the courts of other liberal democracies than
in favor of courts outside the community of liberal countries.189
As Model 2 shows, the Judge Nominated by Republican variable does
not have a significant impact. Thus, my results do not support the
attitudinal model hypothesis that judges’ ideological attitudes affect
the probability of dismissal.190
However, the results do suggest that the factors influencing the
forum non conveniens decisions of conservative judges may differ
from those influencing the forum non conveniens decisions of liberal
judges. When Model 1 is limited to nominees of Democratic presidents, the only significant connecting factor is the place of the injury
(40.7% [8.2, 66.4]).191 The plaintiff’s nationality does not have a significant effect on the probability of dismissal. In contrast, when
Model 1 is limited to nominees of Republican presidents, the place of
the injury is not statistically significant, but the place of conduct is
significant (31.0% [4.6, 56.2]). Notably, the plaintiff’s nationality has
a strong positive impact on the probability of dismissal (32.6% [8.2,
57.0]) when the sample includes only Republican nominees.
These results do not support the theory that conservative judges
have a stronger aversion to forum shopping than liberal judges (at
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When the variable Liberal Democracy is replaced with a variable equal to 1 if the
Polity IV democracy rating is greater than or equal to 5 on a -10 to +10 scale, the effect is
statistically significant at a 90% (but not a 95%) level of confidence.
189
The impact of the Liberal Democracy variable may reflect not a concern about regime
type per se but rather a concern with the perceived adequacy of the proposed alternative
forum. Judges may intuitively be more comfortable dismissing cases in favor of countries
in which there likely would be a fair judicial process. To that extent, the Liberal Democracy
variable might indeed be considered relevant to the determination of whether the foreign
court would be an appropriate alternative. However, in the twenty-two cases in the sample
in which a judge concluded that the alternative forum requirement was not satisfied, the
foreign country was a liberal democracy in ten cases and not a liberal democracy in twelve
cases, suggesting that judges do not use regime type as a proxy for forum adequacy. But see
Lii, supra note 115, at 537–38 (finding that “district courts are less apt to find an adequate
forum in countries with fewer political rights and fewer civil liberties”).
190
As noted above, however, my use of the party of the nominating president as a
measure of the judge’s ideological attitude may underestimate the impact of ideology. See
supra note 181.
191
This is the sort of “situs” tendency that Elizabeth Lear has argued largely explains
forum non conveniens decision making in general. See Lear, supra note 111, at 103 (referring to “the strength of the federal courts’ situs presumption” in forum non conveniens
decision making).
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least not in the forum non conveniens context).192 But they do suggest that conservative and liberal judges may have different conceptions of what constitutes inappropriate transnational forum shopping
into U.S. courts. Judges nominated by Republicans appear more concerned with keeping foreign plaintiffs from forum shopping into the
U.S. federal courts than those nominated by Democrats; and, in terms
of territorial factors, Republican nominees appear more concerned
with the place of conduct, and Democratic nominees appear more
concerned with the place of injury.
The impact of the Foreign Plaintiffs variable may have implications
for U.S. compliance with equal-access provisions in bilateral friendship, commerce, and navigation treaties.193 These provisions require
each signatory to give the other signatory’s citizens access to its courts
equal to that given to its own citizens.194 As previously explained,195
one of the Supreme Court’s key holdings in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno
was that a foreign plaintiff’s choice of a U.S. court “deserves less deference” than that of a U.S. plaintiff.196 The Court justified this distinction as a nondiscriminatory proxy for the convenience of litigating in
a U.S. court.197 Some lower courts have nevertheless held that the
distinction violates the guarantee of equal access.198
If the plaintiff’s nationality is indeed merely a proxy for convenience, then after controlling for other factors affecting convenience—such as the defendant’s citizenship (which generally should
be correlated with how convenient it would be for the defendant to
litigate in a U.S. court) and the place of the plaintiff’s injury and the
defendant’s conduct (which generally should be correlated with the
location of evidence and witnesses)—the plaintiff’s citizenship should
not have a significant and strong independent effect on forum non
R
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See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
See RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 281–82 (5th ed.
2006) (noting approximately twenty-five such treaties and arguing that discrimination in
forum non conveniens decision making could violate them). See generally Allan Jay Stevenson, Forum Non Conveniens and Equal Access Under Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaties: A Foreign Plaintiff’s Rights, 13 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 267 (1990) (analyzing the
relationship between the forum non conveniens doctrine and equal-access provisions).
194
WEINTRAUB, supra note 193.
195
See supra text accompanying notes 100–09.
196
454 U.S. 235, 255–56 (1981).
197
See id.:
When the home forum has been chosen, it is reasonable to assume that this
choice is convenient. When the plaintiff is foreign, however, this assumption is much less reasonable. Because the central purpose of any forum non
conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the trial is convenient, a foreign plaintiff’s choice deserves less deference.
198
See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS 380 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing cases holding that courts must treat foreign
plaintiffs as U.S. citizens for forum non conveniens purposes if they are citizens of signatories of treaties with equal-access provisions).
193
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conveniens decisions.199 Yet it does: other things being equal, U.S.
district court judges are approximately 25% more likely to dismiss on
forum non conveniens grounds when the plaintiff is foreign than
when the plaintiff is a U.S. citizen.200 Moreover, if the doctrine’s goal
is indeed to measure convenience, then the defendant’s citizenship
should also have an impact—but this does not appear to be the
case.201 Although further analysis would be necessary to reach a more
definitive conclusion, this finding suggests that the Piper distinction
between U.S. and foreign plaintiffs, as applied by the U.S. district
courts, is not merely a proxy for convenience, but instead may discriminate against foreign plaintiffs as such, thus raising significant
questions about compliance with equal-access provisions.
Finally, my analysis suggests that forum non conveniens decision
making might not be as unpredictable as widely believed. Model 2
correctly classifies decisions at a rate of 71.1%,202 and the adjusted
count R-squared figure indicates that this represents a 39.8% improvement over the rate at which decisions would be correctly classified by
always guessing the more frequent outcome.203 The 0.793 area under
the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve suggests that this
model does an acceptable job discriminating between grants and denials of forum non conveniens motions.204 A stripped-down model
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199
Cf. Paula K. Speck, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of Law in Admiralty: Time for an
Overhaul, 18 J. MAR. L. & COM. 185, 194 (1987):
[A] court should not grant an FNC dismissal to a defendant who has shown
only slight inconvenience, merely because the opposite party is not a U.S.
citizen or resident. Such a doctrine would place foreigners in an unfavorable position qua foreigners, and they should be able to successfully counter
it by appealing to a treaty designed to protect them in such situations.
200
The estimated effect is 24.1% [6.5, 42.2] in full Model 1 and 26.5% [7.9, 45.1] in
Model 2.
201
As Table 6 shows, the Foreign Defendants variable is not statistically significant.
202
This “correctly classified” figure indicates the proportion of outcomes that the
model correctly classified using a 0.5 probability cutoff to translate predicted probabilities
into dichotomous predictions. See LAWRENCE C. HAMILTON, STATISTICS WITH STATA: UPDATED FOR VERSION 9, at 270–71 (2006) (explaining the correctly classified statistic). Thus,
it indicates the proportion of outcomes for which the model estimated at least a 0.5
probability of a dismissal and in which the court in fact granted a dismissal.
203
When a dependent variable has only two possible outcomes (as is the case here),
one can correctly predict at least 50% of outcomes without any explanatory variables by
always guessing the outcome that is most frequent. See J. SCOTT LONG & JEREMY FREESE,
REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL DEPENDENT VARIABLES USING STATA 111 (2d ed.
2006). Adjusted count R-squared uses this guessing strategy as a baseline to measure the
improvement in predictive power provided by a statistical model. More precisely, adjusted
count R-squared is the proportion of correct predictions beyond the number that would be
correctly predicted simply by choosing the outcome with the largest percentage of observed cases, using a 0.5 probability cutoff. Id. at 111–12.
204
The ROC curve plots 1 minus specificity (the false positive rate) on the x-axis and
sensitivity (the true positive rate) on the y-axis for each possible probability cutoff. See
Douglas G. Altman & J. Martin Bland, Diagnostic Tests 3: Receiver Operating Characteristic Plots,
309 BRIT. MED. J. 188, 188 (1994) (explaining the ROC curve in the medical-diagnostic
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including only factors that can be discerned relatively easily by a forum shopper—the citizenship of the parties and the territorial locus
of the underlying transnational activity—correctly classifies decisions
at a rate of 72.1%, and the adjusted count R-squared figure indicates
that this represents a 40.0% improvement over the rate at which decisions would be correctly classified by always guessing the more frequent outcome. The area under the ROC curve for the stripped
down model is 0.763, suggesting that it also does an acceptable job
discriminating between grants and denials of forum non conveniens
motions.
Overall, my findings suggest that judges apply the forum non conveniens doctrine fairly well. Their decisions appear to be more influenced by factors widely thought to be relevant to the appropriateness
of a U.S. court,205 more predictable,206 and less influenced by
caseload and ideology than critics of the doctrine indicate. Moreover,
although the level of democracy in the country of a proposed alternative foreign court is not directly relevant to the appropriateness of a
plaintiff’s choice of a U.S. court, this factor may reduce the likelihood
of dismissals in favor of countries with legal systems that lack fair judicial processes.207
But my findings also suggest potential problems. Liberal and
conservative judges may emphasize different factors when making forum non conveniens decisions. And contrary to justifications of
Piper’s distinction between U.S. and foreign citizens as a proxy for convenience, the results suggest that forum non conveniens decisions
may discriminate against foreign plaintiffs.
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context). The area under the ROC curve is equal to the probability that a random decision to grant a forum non conveniens motion has a higher value of the dependent variable
than a random decision to deny a forum non conveniens motion. See id. A larger area
under the curve indicates a more discriminating model. See id. One rule of thumb is that
an area of 0.7 to 0.8 is acceptable discrimination, 0.8 to 0.9 is excellent discrimination, and
greater than 0.9 is outstanding discrimination. HOSMER & LEMESHOW, supra note 184, at
162.
205
To be clear, I am not suggesting that connections such as territoriality and citizenship are the only, or even the best, measures of appropriateness. To the contrary, there
are almost surely more sophisticated and refined measures. However, these other measures would be difficult to test empirically and for judges to apply.
206
Of course, while even more predictability might be desirable, it is unclear whether
this could be accomplished without significant tradeoffs in terms of fairness in individual
cases. Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Assessing Minimum Contacts: A Reply to Professors Cameron and
Johnson, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 863, 866–67 (1995) (arguing that in the context of personal
jurisdiction, uncertainty is “inevitable and desirable” because personal jurisdiction is ultimately about fairness and fairness cannot be reduced to “a formula or a clear rule”).
207
Cf. Lii, supra note 164, at 542 (arguing that “even though the definition of an adequate forum does not explicitly require it, there is evidence that district courts are less
likely to find foreign forums adequate in countries with ineffective and corrupt governments and countries that lack the rule of law”).
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CONCLUSION
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Smith Kline & French Labs. Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730, 733 (C.A. 1982).
See supra Part II.
See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 76–85 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.
Id.
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“As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the
United States.”208 Notwithstanding Lord Denning’s widely cited aphorism, this Article suggests that the draw may no longer be as strong as
it once was. According to the conventional understanding, two features of the American forum shopping system encourage plaintiffs to
file transnational claims in U.S. courts: a permissive approach to personal jurisdiction, which increases plaintiffs’ expectations of favorable
court access decisions; and pro-domestic-law bias in choice-of-law decision making, which increases plaintiffs’ expectations that U.S. judges
will apply plaintiff-favoring U.S. substantive law. In our era of globalization, this system is said to have contributed to a transnational litigation explosion.209
But this Article has argued that the forum shopping system has
evolved. In the current system, U.S. district court judges aggressively
use the forum non conveniens doctrine to dismiss transnational litigation, thereby offsetting the incentives created by permissive personal
jurisdiction doctrine; and there no longer appears to be pro-domesticlaw bias in international choice-of-law decision making. Thus, the current system is unlikely to encourage transnational forum shopping
into U.S. courts to the extent suggested by the conventional understanding. In addition, this Article has provided evidence that one important form of transnational litigation—alienage litigation—actually
has been decreasing. Due to lack of data, it is unclear whether other
types of transnational litigation in U.S. courts—such as transnational
litigation in U.S. state courts and transnational litigation in U.S. federal courts based on federal question jurisdiction—are on the same
trajectory or not. Nevertheless, the decline of alienage litigation raises
substantial doubts about the claim that the United States is experiencing a transnational litigation explosion.
However, unlike some of the broader claims about a litigation
explosion in the United States,210 the assumption that there is a transnational litigation explosion is based on a highly plausible logic.211
Thus, this Article’s findings pose a genuine puzzle for legal scholars:
Why, in an age of globalization in which one would expect an increase
in disputes between U.S. citizens and foreign citizens212—and why,
given the well-documented attractions that the U.S. legal system offers
to plaintiffs213—would the number of alienage filings be decreasing?
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There are several intriguing possibilities for scholars to explore as
they work to improve their understanding of the current forum shopping system and its consequences for transnational litigation. For example, perhaps the evolution of the forum shopping system has itself
contributed to the decline in alienage filings by reducing plaintiffs’
expectations of favorable court access and choice-of-law decisions.214
However, even if this is one piece of the alienage litigation puzzle,
other factors are almost surely at play as well. Perhaps transnational
disputes that would once have been filed in the U.S. federal courts are
increasingly being filed in U.S. state courts215 or submitted to transnational arbitration.216 Perhaps “tort reform” in the United States has
reduced the attractiveness of the U.S. legal system for plaintiffs relative to other legal systems;217 or perhaps changes to foreign legal sys-
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214
From this perspective, the role of domestic courts in shaping patterns of transnational forum shopping would be an example of transnational judicial governance. See
Whytock, supra note 21, at 100–01 (describing the impact of judicial allocation of adjudicative authority on transnational forum shopping). In addition to the changes in the American forum-shopping system described above, the amount-in-controversy requirement for
diversity jurisdiction increased from $10,000 to $50,000 in 1988 and to $75,000 in 1996.
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 48, at 45. However, if this were a substantial cause of the
decline in alienage filings, one would expect to see a similar drop in domestic diversity
cases, which did not occur. See supra Figure 3. Second, in 1988, permanent-resident aliens
were classified as U.S. state citizens for diversity purposes, arguably reducing the number of
transnational suits covered by alienage jurisdiction. Cf. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note
135, at 461 (noting this possibility). However, this possibility is difficult to assess without
data on the proportion of transnational suits brought by permanent-resident aliens based
on alienage jurisdiction prior to this change.
215
See, e.g., Robertson & Speck, supra note 111, at 940 (arguing that more transnational personal-injury claims are being filed in state courts precisely because of federal
courts’ aggressive use of the forum non conveniens doctrine). But see
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006) (allowing removal in non-federal-question cases “only if none
of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in
which such action is brought”); KOH, supra note 82, at 15 (arguing that transnational commercial litigation is concentrated in the U.S. federal courts rather than U.S. state courts);
Solimine, supra note 29, at 37 (providing empirical evidence that “appears to confirm the
assumption that foreign defendants see federal courts as more congenial [than state
courts], and when able will remove the case to that forum”). Unfortunately, there is no
existing data on transnational litigation rates in U.S. state courts that permits empirical
testing of this explanation.
216
See Christopher A. Whytock, The Arbitration-Litigation Relationship in Transnational
Dispute Resolution: Empirical Insights from the U.S. Federal Courts, 2 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION
REV. 39, 48 (2008) (empirically documenting an upward trend in transnational arbitration
but concluding that this does not substantially account for the decline in alienage litigation); see also KOH, supra note 82, at 15 (arguing that the “vast bulk of the international
commercial dispute resolution in the United States has tended to transpire not through
arbitration, but through lawsuits in the national courts”).
217
See generally Linda Lipsen, The Evolution of Products Liability as a Federal Policy Issue, in
TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 247 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991) (surveying tort-reform efforts); Glenn Blackmon & Richard Zeckhauser, State Tort Reform Legislation: Assessing
Our Control of Risks, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra, at 272. But see Weintraub, supra note 43, at 163 (“[A]lthough ‘tort reform’ is spreading in the United States,
American law is nevertheless more likely than foreign law to create liability, permit recov-
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tems have increased the attractiveness of those systems compared to
the United States.218 It is also possible that foreigners attempt to
avoid litigating in U.S. courts in fear of antiforeigner bias.219 By moving toward an answer to the alienage litigation puzzle, legal scholars
will develop a better understanding of transnational forum shopping
behavior and the factors that influence it.
An improved understanding is important for legal policy because
there are legitimate concerns about the potentially adverse economic
and political consequences of transnational forum shopping into U.S.
courts.220 Based on these concerns, some legal scholars and policy
advocates have called for legal reforms aimed at curtailing transnational litigation, including the enhanced use of the forum non conveniens doctrine and modified choice-of-law methods that would
guard against pro-domestic-law bias.221 And in Goodyear Luxembourg
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ery for more elements of injury, and award punitive damages. Therefore, choice of United
States law rather than foreign law is likely to favor a foreign plaintiff.” (footnote omitted)).
218
See Mark A. Behrens et al., Global Litigation Trends, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 165,
193–94 (2009) (noting the growing list of countries recognizing multiclaimant litigation
and gradually moving away from prohibitions on contingent fees and punitive damages);
R. Daniel Kelemen & Eric C. Sibbitt, The Globalization of American Law, 58 INT’L ORG. 103,
131 (2004) (arguing that American legal style is spreading globally); Eugene Gulland, All
the World’s a Forum, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 11, 2002, at B13 (arguing that “[r]ecent court decisions
. . . suggest a more aggressive tendency to prefer non-U.S. forums and apply non-U.S. law
to disputes involving U.S. companies”).
219
‘See Utpal Bhattacharya et al., The Home Court Advantage in International Corporate
Litigation, 50 J.L. & ECON. 625, 629 (2007) (concluding that foreign firms are disadvantaged in U.S. courts). But see Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 464 (finding no
support for the existence of antiforeigner bias in U.S. courts). However, regardless of
whether there is in fact an antiforeigner bias, the perception of antiforeigner bias could
affect transnational litigation rates in U.S. courts. See Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due
Process: Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 45
(2006) (“Foreign defendants believe that U.S. courts favor U.S. litigants.”).
220
See Dorward, supra note 16, at 142 (arguing that “tolerance of international forum
shopping creates inefficiencies and conflicts with basic notions of comity and respect for
foreign sovereignty”); Parrish, supra note 219, at 47–48 (noting potential foreign-relations
consequences of transnational litigation in U.S. courts); Sykes, supra note 10, at 340 (arguing that transnational forum shopping into U.S. courts may cause global and national economic welfare to decline); cf. Silberman, supra note 16, at 507 (noting the U.S. Solicitor
General’s argument in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall that assertion of personal
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in U.S. court based on the corporation’s transactions with a U.S. corporation in the United States would have “‘significant potential for
discouraging foreign forums from purchasing American products’” and “‘would thwart
positive efforts of Congress and the Executive Branch to make American firms and products more competitive internationally’” (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 9–10, 11–12, Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (No. 82-1127)).
221
See, e.g., Sykes, supra note 10, at 340 (arguing “for limiting foreign tort plaintiffs to
the law and forum of the jurisdiction in which their harm arose” in appropriate cases);
Global Forum Shopping, supra note 15 (advocating reforms to reduce global forum shopping
into U.S. courts); see also Dorward, supra note 16, at 168 (arguing for continued evolution
of the forum non conveniens doctrine to respond to problems posed by international forum shopping); Weintraub, supra note 43, at 161 (arguing for elimination of “choice-of-law
rules that select American liability law”); cf. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,
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Tires, S.A. v. Brown, now pending before the Supreme Court, the petitioners and their amici curiae supporters are using concerns about
forum shopping to argue for limitations on general jurisdiction in
transnational product liability actions.222 However, according to this
Article’s updated understanding of the American forum shopping system, new anti–forum shopping measures might not be as urgent or
necessary as their advocates claim. Judges are already using the forum
non conveniens doctrine aggressively to dismiss transnational suits,
and they do not appear to display pro-domestic-law bias in international choice-of-law decision making.223
More fundamentally, this Article has presented empirical evidence that raises questions about the need for new anti–forum shopping measures in the first place. Alienage litigation—one of the
principal forms of transnational litigation—is decreasing and constitutes only a small fraction of the total caseload of U.S. district
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251–52 (1981) (holding that an unfavorable change in law does not bar forum non conveniens dismissal and justifying that holding with the assertion that “flow of litigation into
the United States would [otherwise] increase and further congest already crowded
courts”).
222
See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 59, at 9 (arguing that affirming North Carolina’s assertion of general jurisdiction would be an “invitation to rampant forum shopping”); Brief of the Org. for Int’l Inv. & Ass’n of Int’l Auto. Mfrs. Inc. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 59, at 16 (asserting that “[t]he U.S. legal system has had a
problem with forum shopping” and that affirming the state court’s decision “would dramatically expand opportunities for forum shopping”). As suggested supra note 215 and
accompanying text, it is possible that these concerns may be more serious with respect to
transnational claims that are filed in state courts with versions of the forum non conveniens doctrine that are not as robust as the federal doctrine and that are not removable
to federal court. Concern about forum shopping was an explicit factor in the Supreme
Court’s 1981 adoption of a more robust forum non conveniens doctrine in Piper Aircraft Co.
v. Reyno. See 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (asserting that “[t]he American courts, which are already
extremely attractive to foreign plaintiffs, would become even more attractive” and “[t]he
flow of litigation in to the United States would increase and further congest already
crowded courts”).
223
See supra Part III. Clermont has suggested that the courts may be moving back
toward a stricter abuse-of-process approach to forum non conveniens. Kevin M. Clermont,
The Story of Piper: Forum Matters, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 199, 224 (Kevin M. Clermont
ed., 2d ed. 2009). My data is not inconsistent with this possibility: forum non conveniens
dismissal rates in the published decisions of the U.S. district courts have declined from an
estimated 61.3% [48.8, 72.4] in 1990–94, to 45.0% [33.1, 57.5] in 1995–99, to 38.6% [29.1,
49.1] in 2000–2005. But see Childress, supra note 116 (presenting evidence of an increase
in the dismissal rate to 62% since 2007). The overlapping confidence intervals indicate
that these comparative estimates are somewhat uncertain. However, if there has in fact
been such a decline, it may be partly due to selection effects. Having received the judicial
signal that dismissal of transnational suits on forum non conveniens grounds is likely and
aware that the likelihood of dismissal increases as the connections between the litigation
and the United States decrease, plaintiffs may now be filing transnational suits in U.S.
courts that, on average, have closer connections to the United States (and which are therefore less likely to be dismissed) than previously. In other words, plaintiffs may be learning:
the cases most likely to be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds may increasingly
be selected out by plaintiffs’ filing decisions, thus depressing forum non conveniens dismissal rates.
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courts.224 Trends in other forms of transnational litigation may be
different. However, the low and declining levels of alienage litigation
strongly suggest that new anti–forum shopping measures are not advisable absent empirical evidence that transnational forum shopping
into U.S. courts has actually reached levels that are likely to have a net
negative effect on foreign relations or economic welfare. Without
such evidence, the risk is that exaggerated perceptions of transnational litigation in the United States will lead to exaggerated policy
responses.
This risk must be taken seriously because anti–forum shopping
measures aimed at curtailing transnational litigation in U.S. courts
may entail significant costs in terms of access to justice, foreign relations, and regulation of transnational activity.225 For plaintiffs suffering from transnational harms, a forum non conveniens dismissal may
be tantamount to no remedy at all.226 And from a global governance
perspective, transnational litigation in U.S. courts under U.S. substantive law may play an essential role in deterring harmful transnational
activity and ensuring internalization of the negative externalities of
that activity by those engaging in it.227 Anti–forum shopping measures may inhibit these potentially important functions.
The extent of these costs and whether they outweigh the benefits
of additional anti–forum shopping measures are questions that are
not easily answered. Nevertheless, before we adopt such measures, it
is important to take full advantage of available empirical evidence. As
one prominent group of legal scholars puts it, “[i]mproving the civil
justice system requires thoughtful, objective analysis based on sound
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See supra Part III.B.2.
Cf. John R. Wilson, Coming to America to File Suit: Foreign Plaintiffs and the Forum Non
Conveniens Barrier in Transnational Litigation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 659, 661 (2004) (arguing that
the forum non conveniens doctrine “makes American justice less accessible to foreign
plaintiffs”). For a discussion of the potential costs to foreign relations and the regulatory
costs of limiting court access in transnational disputes using instruments such as the forum
non conveniens doctrine, see Robertson, supra note 11.
226
See Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Conflict and Jurisdictional Equilibration: Paths to
a Via Media?, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 385, 398 (2004) (arguing that forum non conveniens
dismissals are often insuperable barriers to transnational claims); Robertson, supra note 89,
417–21 (finding that after forum non conveniens dismissals, plaintiffs rarely refile in the
proposed alternative forum).
227
See Lear, supra note 112, at 562 (arguing that liberal use of forum non conveniens
doctrine undermines an important national interest in deterring harmful transnational
activity); Weinberg, supra note 9, at 70–71 (arguing that application of foreign law rather
than U.S. law both undermines regulation and risks eroding national and worldwide safety
and security); Stephen J. Darmody, Note, An Economic Approach to Forum Non Conveniens
Dismissals Requested by U.S. Multinational Corporations—The Bhopal Case, 22 GEO. WASH. J.
INT’L L. & ECON. 215, 240–51 (1988) (arguing that by sending transnational suits to jurisdictions that will not ensure that defendants adequately internalize negative externalities
of their transnational activity, forum non conveniens dismissals can reduce economic
efficiency).
225
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empirical data.”228 This Article’s findings are a step toward building
the empirical foundations needed for well-informed deliberation
about the proper legal responses to transnational forum shopping
into U.S. courts.
The debate over transnational litigation in the United States is
marked by one of the basic dilemmas of litigation policy: How should
we balance the goal of ensuring access to justice with concerns about
the economic costs of litigation? Recent developments in civil procedure—including shifts toward more prodefendant, litigation-limiting
standards of summary judgment and pleading—indicate that the balance may be tilting away from access to justice.229 This Article’s analysis suggests that the evolution of the American forum shopping system
may be part of this broader trend.
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228
Marc Galanter et al., How to Improve Civil Justice Policy: Systematic Collection of Data on
the Civil Justice System Is Needed for Reasoned and Effective Policy Making, 77 JUDICATURE 185,
185 (1994).
229
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–54 (2009) (adopting more restrictive pleading standards); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–28 (1986) (reducing
moving party’s burden in summary judgment context). See generally Robertson, supra note
11 (documenting reduced court access in transnational litigation); A. Benjamin Spencer,
Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, 200 (2010)
(referring to “a shift toward a restrictive ethos in civil procedure, meaning an ethos oriented more towards protecting the interests of defendants—particularly those from the
dominant or commercial class—against the civil claims of members of societal out-groups”
(footnote omitted)).

